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I. GENERAL PROBLEMS
The question of characterization of a particular claim arose in a
number of cases involving direct action against insurers, the civil or penal
nature of the demand, and the statute of frauds.
In Ehrlichman v. Yarrington' the defendant urged that the Shingleton
v. Bussey' rule, allowing direct action against the insurer, was procedural
in nature and, consequently, inapplicable in a federal court. However, the
court held that Shingleton "enunciated a substantive rather than a pro-
cedural rule of law," and added that a federal court sitting in diversity
"may not disregard the applicable substantive law of the forum state."'
Both the characterization of Florida's direct action and its availability
in an action in New York was involved in Barrios v. Dade County.4
Plaintiff brought a Florida based tort claim before a New York federal
court under the much discussed and often criticized decision of Seider v.
Roth.5 Defendants, Dade County and the insurance company, pressed the
point that Shingleton established a procedural rule and as such is inap-
plicable outside of Florida. The argument was declined on the ground that
Florida's holding in Shingleton recognized a "substantive right to an
injured person as a third party beneficiary of the insurance policy to re-
cover from the liability insurer of the tortfeasor."6 Florida, like Puerto
Rico in Oltarsh v. Aetna Insurance Co.,7 has created a "separate and
distinct right of action against the insurer where no such right had pre-
viously existed and thus effected a radical change in the rights accorded
injured persons."' The fact that this right was "judicially" rather than
"legislatively created" does not "detract from its force."' The second argu-
ment advanced by defendants was based on the New York law providing
that, absent a judgment against the insured remaining unpaid for thirty
1. 306 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Fla. 1969) (withdrawn by order of the court and is only pub-
lished in slip form in advance sheets).
2. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
3. Ehrlichman v. Yarrington, 306 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
4. 310 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
5. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
6. Barrios v. Dade County, 310 F. Supp. 744, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
7. 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965).
8. Id. at 116, 204 N.E.2d at 624, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
9. Barrios v. Dade County, 310 F. Supp. 744, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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days, this kind of action is not available. This argument was previously
rejected in Oltarsh; '0 in Barrios the court only added that New York being
receptive to direct actions by its residents against insurers aris-
ing from out-of-state accidents, at least when direct actions are
authorized by the situs state, and with Florida, the place where
the accident occurred, granting the right to maintain such suits,
there is at present no basis for any claim that New York State
policy would be offended by this action."
The distinction between civil and penal statutes was at issue in
Holbein v. Rigot.12 In an action upon a Texas default judgment, the ap-
pellate court denied full faith and credit to the part of the sister-state
judgment which awarded exemplary or punitive damages as being penal
in nature. The Florida Supreme Court reversed on the ground that this
part of the judgment was not "based on a Texas penal statute but was
based on general common law liability for false, fraudulent and malicious
representations on the part of defendant,"' 3 on the authority of Hunting-
ton v. Attrill,14 James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry,5 and the
popular Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. 6 The court held that the attacked
part of the Texas judgment redresses a "private wrong inflicted on plain-
tiffs and did not purport to redress a public wrong predicated on a statute
that is penal in the international sense which may not be enforced in the
court of other states.'
' 17
Whether the statute of frauds is procedural or substantive had to be
decided in Talmudical Academy v. Harris." Even though the Statute of
Frauds is classified as substantive and is governed by the lex causae,19
in this particular case the court held that the Florida statute,2" providing
that agreements to make a will, to give a legacy, or to make a bequest shall
be binding only if made in testamentary form, applied to an agreement
made in Maryland to be performed in Florida because this statute was
classified as being procedural, and therefore, controlled by the lex fori,
i.e., Florida. In the opinion of the court, this provision is part of the
Florida probate law and does not deal "with the validity of an agreement
10. Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965).
11. Barrios v. Dade County, 310 F. Supp. 744, 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
12. 245 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1971).
13. Id. at 59.
14. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
15. 273 U.S. 119 (1926).
16. 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
17. Holbein v. Rigot, 245 So.2d 57, 61 (Fla. 1971).
18. 238 So.2d 161 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970). Cf. Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360
P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
19. Castorri v. Milbrand, 118 So.2d 563 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960); see Survey I at 275; cf.,
Ideal Structures Corp. v. Levine Huntsville Dev. Corp., 396 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1968).
20. FLA. STAT. §§ 725.01, 731.051 (1969).
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but with the enforceability of the agreement in the courts of this state; "21
and as such is "part of the public policy of the state dealing with the kind
of claim against an estate that will be allowed or enforced by the court
of the state."22 Therefore, the provision is "procedural in nature and ap-
plicable to all actions such as the present one brought in this state."2 8
There are signs that the survival of the traditional characterization
of the statutes of limitations as procedural may be threatened. Not only
has this characterization been weakened by the adoption, in many states,
of a borrowing statute,24 but also by a gradual erosion, noticeable for
example, in Ramsay v. Boeing Co." In Ramsay; the statute of limitations
in force at the locus delicti, i.e., Belgium, was applied to a claim arising
from an aircraft crash on the basis that the forum state, Mississippi, has
adopted the center-of-gravity doctrine. Following this approach, the fact
that the airplane was owned and operated by a Belgian airline and crashed
in Belgium would put the center-of-gravity there. This fact was considered
along with a number of forum state cases which "follow a foreign pre-
scriptive period imposed on a cause of action arising under a foreign
statute, if the prescription is contained in the statute creating the right
of action." 6
A number of cases discussed other questions related to the statutes of
limitations. The time when a cause of action accrued to a client was de-
cisive in an action brought by a client against his attorney for damages
caused by the belated filing of a complaint for malicious prosecution
suffered in Honduras. Originally, the complaint was filed in a federal
court in New York, but was dismissed as barred by the New York statute
of limitations. In the present action brought in Florida for malpractice,
the court had to decide whether the claim accrued at the time the New
York action was held barred or at the time when the client was notified
of the outcome of the New York action. Without entering into the conflict
aspects of the issue, the court held that the claim accrued at the time of
notification. Consequently; at this moment the three year limitation
started to run, the court accepting the position that the New York statute
of limitations, the then lex fori, applies.
The one year suit clause was litigated in Quarty v. Insurance Co. of
North America." The summary judgment in favor of the insurer on the
authority of Holderness v. Hamilton Insurance Co." was affirmed on ap-
peal against plaintiff's contention that Florida Statutes section 95.03
21. Talmudical Academy v. Harris, 238 So.2d 161, 162 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
22. Id. at 162.
23. Id.
24. See Survey III at 510; Survey IV at 434.
25. 432 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1970).
26. Id. at 597. Keaton v. Crayton, 326 F. Supp. 1155 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (Florida statute
of limitations applied under Missouri borrowing statute).
27. Downing v. Vaine, 228 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
28. 244 So.2d 181 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
29. 54 F. Supp. 145 (S.D. Fla. 1944).
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(1969) voids such agreements. The appellate court relied on the advisory
opinion of the Florida Supreme Court in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Clay3" where the court observed that the "Legislature of this state could
not conceivably have any interest in a contract executed in another state,"
and added that "imputing any such intention to the Florida Legislature
would be an absurdity."'" The United States Supreme Court in its final
determination of the Clay controversy 2 bypassed this argument and, in-
stead, evaluated particular contacts present in the case. Comparing these
contacts with the ones in the present case, the appellate court emphasized
not only that in the latter the contract was made in New York by New
York residents, the premiums were paid there, and the loss occurred in
New York, but also that the mere fact of plaintiff's moving to Florida
within twelve months after the loss occurred "did not give Florida ample
contacts with the transaction and the parties to satisfy any conceivable
requirement of full faith and credit or due process"3 and reversed.
The Florida borrowing statute was applied in an action brought by
an employee against his employer for damages arising from an accident
in Alabama. 4 The district court, sitting in diversity, relied on the Florida
Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, 5 and found that Alabama's
Code 6 provides for a one year limitation which, being shorter, prevails
in Florida under the Florida borrowing statute. The court added that the
same result is reached under Florida's lex loci delicti rule,87 thus overlook-
ing the well established Florida rule that statutes of limitations are pro-
cedural in nature.
The method of ascertaining the applicable rule of foreign law was
litigated in State-Wide Insurance Co. v. Flaks.8 There the court pointed
out that Florida Statutes section 92.031 (1969) offers two alternatives to
a party pleading "common law and statutes of every state, territory and
other jurisdiction of the United States;" one, to present evidence of such
law, and another, to have the court "take judicial notice of it."3 The
party relying on foreign law must plead and prove it; in absence of such
showing, the court may assume that foreign law, in this case the law of
the Bahamas, is the same as Florida law.4°
Facing a question involving parol evidence, the court in Chase
30. 133 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1961).
31. Id. at 738.
32. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964) ; see Survey II at 497.
33. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
34. Griffin v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 307 F. Supp. 741 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
35. FLA. STAT. §§ 92.01, 92.031 (1969).
36. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 26 (1958).
37. FLA. STAT. § 95.10 (1969); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 424 F.2d
427 (2d Cir. 1970) (action for implied warranty for damages arising out of a Florida air-
plane crash barred by a New York statute of limitations).
38. 233 So.2d 400 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
39. Id. at 402.
40. Bethell v. Peace, 441 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1971).
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Manhattan Bank v. First Marion Bank4' undertook the discussion with
strong misgivings: "To even the most courageous Pickwickian, the parol
evidence rule must seem a treacherous bog in the field of contract law.
Interspersed in this quagmire are quicksand-like state court decisions,
which appear equitable in specific situations but remain perilous for
legal precedent."42 Fortunately, this question had no conflicts overtones
since only the meaning of the applicable substantive law, the New York
version of the Uniform Commercial Code, had to be ascertained.
A novel doctrine which is forcing its way from law reviews into
courts is that of false conflicts.43 In essence, the doctrine deals with a
number of unrelated situations; among them the following may be men-
tioned:
(1) After the conflict analysis according to the conflict law of the
forum has been completed, it appears that there is no difference between
the potentially applicable foreign laws and the laws in force at the forum.
It also may be that the forum and the involved foreign jurisdictions rely
on the same conflict rule, and therefore would likely reach the same
result.
(2) Both jurisdictions, that of the forum and that identified by the
forum's conflict rule, supply different substantive rules, but only the
forum has what is termed a "real governmental interest" in having its
substantive rule applied.
(3) As a variant, both legal systems have "real governmental in-
terest," but the forum may take a conciliatory attitude and forego ap-
plication of its rule.
(4) None of the jurisdictions involved, i.e., the forum and the foreign
jurisdiction whose law should be applied according to forum's own conflict
law; has any governmental interest in having its substantive law applied.
If there is anything which these situations have in common, it is the
fact that they show a way to avoid the application of the forum's own
conflict rule by substituting the forum's own substantive law, on the
ground that the forum has a governmental interest in having its sub-
stantive law applied regardless of the precept contained in its own conflict
rule. Of course, there is nothing false about the conflicts method applied
in these cases before the stage of refusing to follow the forum's own con-
flict rules is reached. In fact, a complete conflicts analysis is undertaken
before the false conflict doctrine is resorted to: the forum's proper conflict
rule is identified; the controlling foreign rule found; and, then the decision
is made that the latter is unacceptable for one reason or another, usually
41. 437 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1971).
42. Id. at 1045.
43. D. CAVERS, THE CHoIcE-op-LAW PROCFSS 63 (1965); Traynor, Is This Conflict
Really Necessary?, 37 Tx. L. REv. 657 (1959); Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives
in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L. J. 171; Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the "Better
Rule": Threat and Promise in Multistate Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 847 (1967); Leflar,
True 'False Conflicts', et alia, 48 B.U.L. REv. 164 (1968); Comment, False Conflicts, 55
CAL. L. REV. 74 (1967).
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because of an overriding governmental interest in having the forum's own
substantive law applied.
Of the situations selected above as representative of the doctrine,
situation (1) deals with nothing false or unusual. It is true in the sense
that an identical result is reached both ways; but this speaks in favor of
the solution found rather than for the truth or falsity of the method.
Under type (2) the weighing of governmental interests is introduced, a
criterion which originated from situations where true governmental or
para-governmental activities, like workmen's compensation44 or judicial
remedies,45 were involved. However, the extension of this test to private
claims arising; for example, from contracts, makes the criterion vague and,
in most instances, far-fetched. On the other hand, in tort and insurance46
situations, governmental interests may exist at least to some extent. The
overextension of this test becomes even more apparent if the degree of
''conflicting" governmental interests is tested in litigation where the only
interest on the part of the plaintiff is to get as much as the law, urged
by him, would allow, and the only interest on the defendant's part, to get
away with as little as any law would allow. In most cases the net result
of the doctrine is to secure plaintiffs the benefit of the forum's law when-
ever it appears more favorable to local residents, while an outsider is
handicapped by the fact that his "protecting government" is eliminated
from proceedings while the local government speaks through its own
forum. In any case, the alleged governmental interests are unavoidably
weighted by an uneven hand and crass parochial attitudes incompatible
with the standard of equal protection of the law. It may be added that to
some extent the underlying technique is reminiscent of the traditional
public policy test designed to block the application of an otherwise con-
trolling rule of foreign law on the ground that the foreign rule is incom-
patible with the forum's fundamental legal or moral tenets. In many
cases, the doctrine is nothing but an expansion of the "protective"
principle favoring local plaintiffs over outsiders.
Turning to variant (3), the compromise is a misnomer since only one
of the interested jurisdictions; the forum, is participating. The variant
under (4) leaves both jurisdictions without an interest in the question of
what law should apply. It is only hoped that in spite of such aloofness the
forum will feel duty bound to decide the case even if it has to reach for
the uninspiringly simple conflict rule of the forum.
All this discussion should preface the fact that two Florida-
related federal cases came close to rubbing elbows with the false conflict
newcomer. In Merlite Land Sea & Sky, Inc. v. Palm Beach Investment
Properties, Inc.,47 the appellate court found the situation to amount to
44. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
45. Watson v. Employer's Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
46. Id.
47. 426 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1970).
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type (1). This realization made the dilemma between Florida and New
York law moot since "there is apparently no disparity on the substantive
principles concerning this case." '48 Also worthy of passing mention is the
case of Singleton v. Foreman.49 There the conflict-in its traditional sense
-was between the law of Tennessee, the place of the making of the con-
tract, and the law of Florida, the place of performance. Here, too, the court
did not need struggle with the question of the controlling law "since under
either approach Florida law would apply."5
The rise and decline of the false conflict doctrine is exemplified by
recent events in Louisiana. The federal district court with jurisdiction
based on diversity in Lester v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,5 relying on the
"modern conflicts approach" adopted by a Louisiana appellate court 2
as indicative of developments along the "modern trend of emphasizing
significant contacts, 51 3 ruled in favor of application of Louisiana law on
the ground that "Louisiana contacts are so significant."54 The court also
assumed that "Louisiana courts would give a party the benefits of
Louisiana law,"55 which would be favorable to the resident plaintiff and
unfavorable to a foreign insurance company. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit,
adopting this "more sophisticated and modern approach,"5 had to over-
come the decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Johnson v. St. Paul
Mercury Insurance Co.57 This Louisiana decision was rendered after the
district court decision and reaffirmed the lex loci delicti rule. This, of
course, "extinguished the theorizing of the trial court,"5 8 but did not pre-
vent the appellate court from affirming the result "on different grounds
since ... no conflict is present."59 Enters deus ex machina, and clothed in
the false conflicts doctrine, ordains that difficulties which had arisen among
protagonists are but consequences of nefarious goings-on in the court
below, where the "parties and the court below . . . created a 'false
conflict.' "" Thus wiping the stage clean of errors, the "Klaxon principle
48. Id. at 497 n.2.
49. 435 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1970).
50. Id. at 968-69.
51. 295 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. La. 1968).
52. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Hulett, 151 So.2d 705 (La. App. 1963).
53. Lester v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (W.D. La. 1968).
54. Id., emphasizing the
tremendous changes which the area of conflicts of law has undergone since 1965.
Applying the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts," many courts through-
out the United States have discarded or modified the traditional and once well estab-
lished conflicts rules. The new and more rational approach avoids mechanical
application of the law of the place of making or performance of a contract; rather
it places emphasis upon the laws of the State having the most significant quantitative
or qualitative contacts directly concerning the matter in dispute.
Id. at 1211
55. Id. at 1212.
56. Lester v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 433 F.2d 884, 887 (5th Cir. 1970).
57. 256 La. 289, 236 So.2d 216 (1970), reh. denied. Cf. Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich.
510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969).
58. Lester v. Aetna Ins. Co., 433 F.2d 884, 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
59. Id. at 889.
60. Id.
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[becomes] inapplicable"'" and with it the rule in Johnson.2 Noting that
the "laws of Louisiana and of Wisconsin as to notice differ materially," 8
the court, following a well trod path, decided the issue by balancing the
governmental interests of both states. The interest of the lex fori won on
the ground that "only Louisiana has even the remotest interest in having
its law applied,"64 while Wisconsin has no "interest in relieving [the
insurer], a non-domiciliary insurance company, of the burden of giving
notice ... ."' The court added that the Wisconsin policy of "protecting
its own domiciliary insurers against mandatory notice requirements would
be neither furthered nor impinged upon by application of Louisiana law
in this case.""6
It is indeed significant that in subsequent decisions federal courts
shied away from the position taken in Lester. In Pendleton v. Aetna Life
Insurance Co.,6 7 the court took notice of Lester but found that the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Johnson had "emphatically rejected over
thirty years of modern thought and modern authority in favor of the
much condemned and 'archaic' rules of the lex loci.6 8 Nevertheless, in the
true spirit of Erie-Klaxon, the court applied Louisiana law as stated in
Johnson, taking comfort from the fact that that case was one of the
innocuous variety since the "application of either law [Georgia or Loui-
siana] would lead to the same result."69 The court was even more ex-
plicit in Franklin v. Texas International Petroleum Corp.70 There it
tackled the false conflict doctrine head-on by stating not only that it "re-
quires the same type of interest analysis and contact analysis which the
Louisiana Supreme Court expressly and emphatically rejected in John-
son,"'" but also that it "leads to the same degree of uncertainty as the more
'modern' conflict approaches and that uncertainty appears to be the com-
pelling reason that the Louisiana Supreme Court fully embraced the lex
loci delicti approach."72 Accordingly, the court "being strictly bound as we
are by the pronouncement of the Louisiana Supreme Court,"7 felt "com-
pelled to follow the lex loci delicti rule," '74 even though it did so "re-
luctantly."
61. Id.
62. Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 256 La. 289, 236 So.2d 216 (1970).
63. Lester v. Aetna Ins. Co., 433 F.2d 844, 890 (5th Cir. 1970).
64. Id. at 890.
65. Id. at 891.
66. Id. The ruling also violates the equal protection standard by applying in a diversity
case law different from that in force in the forum state. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
67. Pendelton v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. La. 1970).
68. Id. at 428, quoting Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 256 La. 289, 298, 236
So.2d 216, 225 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
69. Pendelton v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 425, 428 n.3 (E.D. La. 1970).
70. 324 F. Supp. 808 (W.D. La. 1971).
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II. JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS
The notion of judicial jurisdiction was recently redefined in T.J.K.
v. N.B.75 as having two meanings. One meaning is the "power of the court
to act either upon given property or with respect to a given subject matter
or as to subject the given parties to personal liability ....,"" The second
meaning is the "requirement that a reasonable method of notification be
employed and a reasonable opportunity to be heard be afforded to the
persons affected, ' 77 an explanation of perfecting jurisdiction rather than
of jurisdiction as such. In any case, jurisdiction is the "oxygen of an action.
If present, the action is alive and the court may act."7 8
For jurisdictional purposes, three types of actions, in personam, in
rem, and quasi in rem present a useful classification. The court in T.J.K.
v. N.B.79 indicated that the "state has jurisdiction to entertain an action 'in
personam' over persons within its territory and to entertain actions 'in
rem' with respect to things within its territory.""° In actions quasi in
rem, jurisdiction is exercised to "enforce a personal claim against the
defendant to the extent of applying the thing or property seized in satis-
faction of the claim.""' Moreover, the state must provide a procedure
"reasonably calculated to give the persons effective notice of the action
and a reasonable opportunity to contest the claim."82 The classic way to
perfect jurisdiction remains by service of process on the defendant within
the court's jurisdiction since "[s]uch service at one stroke satisfies both
the power and notice requirements of jurisdiction."83 In actions in rem
and quasi in rem there must also be "some reasonable means of notify-
ing persons to be affected of the pendency of the action,"'8 4 which does
not include any notion that such person be within the state at any time or
that notification be given there. The power notion is satisfied by power
over the thing.
Besides presence within the jurisdiction coupled with service, domi-
cile is another traditional jurisdiction creating factor. Although the terms
residence and domicile have distinct meanings, they are often used inter-
changeably. Nevertheless, in the strict sense domicile is the "place where
a person has fixed his abode with the present intention of making it his
permanent home. 8 5 Persons who have established domicile in Florida
may "manifest and evidence" it by a sworn statement filed with the circuit
75. 237 So.2d 592 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
76. Id. at 594.
77. Id.
78. Keena v. Keena, 245 So.2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
79. 237 So.2d 592 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).





85. Crapps v. Duval County Hosp. Authority, 314 F. Supp. 181, 183 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
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court.8 6 In case such a person "maintain[s] another place or places of
abode in some other state or states," he also may file a statement that the
"place of abode in Florida constitutes his predominant and principal
home, and that he intends to continue it permanently as such.""s
Service of process requires compliance with statutory provisions,
which are subject to the constitutional standards of due process in order
to make certain that a person, when sued, "has notice of the suit and an
opportunity to defend."188 The defendant is even under an obligation to
accept service of process which may be performed without the need to have
touched it physically. However, for constructive service in a quiet title
suit against a nonresident defendant to be effective, strict compliance with
the statute is required."
Special jurisdictional rules have developed in courts of equity. In
addition to continuing jurisdiction,9" a court of equity may act in per-
sonam with respect to interests in land situated outside of its jurisdiction.
In Bethell v. Peace,1 the land to be sold was located in the Bahamas, yet
the court maintained jurisdiction on the following grounds: (1) that the
parties to the suit were United States nationals personally before the
court; (2) that the agreement to sell the land in the Bahamas was signed
in Florida; and, (3) that the defendant, a licensed real estate broker in
Florida who "engineered" the deal, "owed fiduciary obligations to Flor-
idians by virtue of that license." 2 The chancellor may even reach into
foreign countries by enjoining persons under his jurisdiction from litigat-
ing abroad. In the case just cited, the court met attacks on such in-
junction by pointing out that according to Florida law
[t]his power of a court of equity of one state to restrain its own
citizens from prosecuting actions in a sister state when such
actions serve to vex, harass, or oppress an opponent is too well
established to admit of controversy.
93
In a somewhat comparable situation; the appellate court reversed
the lower court's decree which enjoined a foreign corporation from main-
taining an action in its own country, i.e., in the Bahamas, on the ground
86. FLA. STAT. § 222.17(1) (Supp. 1970).
87. FLA. STAT. § 222.17(1) (Supp. 1970).
88. Haney v. Olin Corp., 245 So.2d 671, 673 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
89. Gmaz v. King, 238 So.2d 511 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
90. See section V, D, infra.
91. 441 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1971); cf. Jackson v. Jackson, 129 So.2d 692 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1961). The method of substituted service under FLA. STAT. § 48.161 (1969), which requires that
a copy be left with the public office, has now been amended by Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-308,
§ 1, to allow the alternative of "mailing the copies by certified mail to the public officer with
the fee." The fee was increased as were those in FLA. STAT. § 48.091 (1969). However, the fee
under FLA. STAT. § 48.161 (1969) was immediately reduced to its original amount by Fla.
Laws 1971, ch. 71-308, § 1.
92. Bethell v. Peace, 441 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1971).
93. Groff G.M.C. Trucks v. Driggens, 101 So.2d 58, 60 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1958).
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that such power is rarely exercised "at the instance of those who are not
residents of the state where the relief is sought."94 The court stated that
this principle is "especially applicable to instances where both parties are
non-residents of this jurisdiction and are both residents of the same foreign
country."95 Moreover, the injunction "affects the jurisdiction of a foreign
sovereign over its own corporations and over a cause of action arising in
the sovereign's own territory; "I' the injunction also affects the parties'
"access to the courts of their own country; "97 and, finally, there was no
"absolute necess [ity] to protect any interest in this state."9" In a
parallel case99 between the same parties, the question of jurisdiction was
limited to appellant's unsuccessful contention that the trial court was
without jurisdiction of the subject matter of a suit to restrain the defendant
from prosecuting an action in the Bahamas to stay the resort to arbitra-
tion.
An injunction against litigating abroad may be based on a contract
clause subjecting by agreement (prorogation)'o a certain kind of dispute
to a foreign court. In the case of In re Unterweser Reederei, GmbH,'
a contract of towage provided, inter alia, that "[a]ny dispute must be
litigated before the High Court of Justice in London."'0 2 When one of the
parties involved in an admiralty suit for limitation brought a related action
in the High Court of Justice in England, the party was enjoined by the
federal court. On appeal, the federal court took notice of the fact that
it administers equity in an admiralty suit and affirmed the injunction on
the ground that the moving party itself has "invoked, albeit reluctantly,
that very jurisdiction.' 03 Even though "a domestic court has no power
to restrain the courts of a foreign nation,"'1 4 the court continued, "it has
admitted power to deal with litigants properly before it. An exercise of the
latter power is not the assumption of the former."' 5 This rule also applies
94. Roberts Realty of the Bahamas, Ltd. v. Miller & Solomon, Ltd., 234 So.2d 417 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1970).




99. Roberts Realty of the Bahamas Ltd. v. Miller & Solomon, Ltd., 234 So.2d 416 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1970).
100. Lenhoff, The Parties' Choice of a Forum: Prorogation Agreements, 15 RUTGERS L.
REV. 414 (1961); Reese, The Contractual Forum: Situation in the United States, 13 Am. J.
ComP. L. 187 (1964).
101. 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), panel opinion adopted by court en banc, 446 F.2d
907 (5th Cir. 1971), aflirming 296 F. Supp. 733 (M.D. Fla. 1969); see Survey IV at 502.
See also weighty dissents at 428 F.2d 888, 896, reiterated at 446 F.2d 907, 911; Juenger,
Vereinbarungen uber den Gerichtstand nach amerikanischen Recht, 35 RABELS ZTSCHR. 284
(1971).
102. In re Unterweser Reederei, GmnbH, 428 F.2d 888, 889 (5th Cir. 1970).




in admiralty on the ground that "in the Admiralty the Chancellor now
goes to sea and has adequate equitable reserves."'1 6
A forum selection clause may also be used as the ground to attack
the jurisdiction of a court other than the one chosen by prorogation. In
Unterweser the motion requesting that the court "decline to exercise
admitted jurisdiction under the facts of the present case,' 1 °7 was made in
vain. The court held that the "forum selection clause, in and of itself,
did not compel the district court to stay proceedings in the limitation
action so that the parties might litigate in England pursuant to its pro-
visions."' The holding was based on the authority of Carbon Black
Export, Inc. v. The SS Monrosa'0 9 which stands for the proposition that
forum selection clauses do not apply to proceedings in rem.
The question of attachment of land within Florida belonging to non-
resident tenants under Florida Statutes section 76.09 (1969) was litigated
in Robinson v. Loyola Foundation.10
The jurisdictional aspects of the cognovit clause, as discussed in pre-
vious surveys"' are continuously being questioned along the lines indi-
cated."'2
A. Long-Arm Statutes
It is true that "[t]he reservoir of state jurisdictional power over
non-residents has swollen tremendously in recent years. The receding
boundaries of due process reflect the fundamental changes in the national
economy since the days of Pennoyer v. Neff.""' This trend, however,
should not be interpreted as heralding the eventual demise of all restric-
tions; the touchstone announced in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton"4 still requires "minimum contacts." The rule was updated in Hanson
v. Dencklal" to require the defendant to purposefully avail himself "of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protection of its laws.""' 6
Jurisdiction creating acts may consist of continuous activities or they
may be a single act, e.g., a business venture or a car accident. According
to a recent Florida decision,"' three criteria emerge from cases determin-
106. Id., quoting Guillot v. Cenac Towing Co., 366 F.2d 898, 904 (5th Cir. 1966).
107. In re Unterweser Reederei, GmbH, 428 F.2d 888, 893 (5th Cir. 1970).
108. Id. at 894.
109. 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959), rehearing de-
nied, 359 U.S. 999 (1959).
110. 236 So.2d 154 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
111. See Survey I at 276; Survey IV at 439.
112. Cf. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Osmond v. Spence, 327
F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971).
113. Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315, 1316 (5th Cir. 1970).
114. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
115. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
116. Id. at 253. Cf. Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969).
117. Horace v. American National Bank & Trust Co., 251 So.2d 33 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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ing the present outer limits of in personam jurisdiction based on a single
act:
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the
privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in
the forum state; second, the cause of action must derive from the
defendant's activities there; third, the acts of the defendant or
consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial
enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.
118
Generally, this summary is correct; nevertheless, it must be implemented
by compliance with the jurisdiction creating acts as identified in the
respective long-arm statutes and the exception to the connexity" 9 require-
ment established in the Simari amendment.
1 20
Traditionally, states have shaped their long-arm statutes by identify-
ing the particular acts on the part of the nonresident individual or cor-
porate defendant which are jurisdiction creating. Recently a few states'
2
1
have abandoned this descriptive method and replaced it with a general
incorporation of due process standard into their statutes. California,
for example, has formulated this glib evasion from the vicissitudes of
statutory verbalization and constitutional difficulties by granting jurisdic-
tion "on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state
or of the United States." 22 This kind of legislation not only automatically
turns every long-arm case into a constitutional problem, but is also vague
and overbroad and, consequently, vulnerable on constitutional grounds
since "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its mean-
ing and differ as to its application."' 28 Furthermore, by incorporating into
state statutes a general constitutional standard, the legislature indicated
only a constitutional outer limit of judicial jurisdiction without informing
"men of common intelligence" regarding situations safely within this con-
stitutional perimeter. Finally, the guidelines emanating from the trilogy of
International Shoe,'24 McGee,'25 and Hanson,'26 are fraught with "all the
subtleties and refinements born of history and embodied in case experience
developed in the context of federal adjudication."' 27 Strictly speaking,
118. Id. at 46 (emphasis added by court).
119. See Survey IV at 449.
120. FLA. STAT. § 48.081(5) (1969) ; see Survey III at 525.
121. N.J. Civ. PRAc. R. 4: 4-4(d) (2) (West 1971) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 9-5-33 (1969
Reenactment). Cf. Westphal v. Stone Mfg. Co., 305 F. Supp. 1187 (D.R.I. 1969) (comment-
ing on the Rhode Island statute).
122. CAL. CODE Civ. P. § 410.10 (Deering Supp. 1971). Cf. Marra v. Shea, 321 F. Supp.
1140 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
123. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 91 S. Ct. 1686, 1689 (1971); Lanzetta v. New Jer-
sey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ; Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
124. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
125. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
126. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
127. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 130 (1970) (concurring opinion).
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the exact holdings of these cases are quite narrow and, as a consequence,
incomplete, leaving "men of common intelligence" with a multitude of
unanswered questions instead of clearly and precisely delineating the
statute's reach in words of common understanding. Even legislators must
keep in mind that men desiring to engage in these activities should not be
required to guess what activities are proper and subject themselves to
consequences if their estimates later prove incorrect. Unless, of course,
law should again become a secret knowledge closely guarded by the
initiated.
Turning now closer to home, it is to be pointed out that Florida's long-
arm statutes consist of a hard-to-manage multitude of amendments and
additions of which the innovation involving torts128 is the most recent
example.
1. NONRESIDENT MOTORISTS
Questions turning around this type of long-arm statute seem to be
well answered. A particular fact situation was litigated in Hoover v.
Gates."'9 In that case the nonresident owner parked his car so that the
rear of the attached trailer protruded into the street and caused injury.
The owner was held amenable to Florida courts under section 48.171
Florida Statutes, on the ground that the injury was "occasioned in the
operation of his motor vehicle."'1 0
2. NONRESIDENT AIRCRAFT AND WATERCRAFT OPERATORS
The omission of aircraft in the re-enactment of section 47.162 of
Florida Statutes in 1967 as Section 48.19 Florida Statutes was corrected
in 1970 by enacting the complete original text, including a reference to
aircraft. 3 '
3. BUSINESS BY NONRESIDENTS
As has been stated repeatedly,'82 the application of long-arm statutes
aiming at nonresident business requires that the business activity included
in section 48.181 of the Florida Statutes (1969) as business or business
venture has been or is being performed in the state and that the claim
arose therefrom, except in Simari situations. 8' This statement must be
qualified by the requirement that the application of the statute may not
transgress constitutional limitations imposed by due process.'84
128. See section II supra.
129. 229 So.2d 909 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
130. Id.
131. FLA. STAT. § 48.19 (Supp. 1970), amending FLA. STAT. § 48.19 (1969). See Survey
IV at 444. Intertemporal problems are discussed in Central Nat'l Bank v. Kelley, 253 So.2d
141 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
132. See Survey III at 514.
133. FLA. STAT. § 48.081(5) (1969).
134. See Survey III at 515.
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In regard to the kind of activity covered by section 48.181 of the
Florida Statutes (1969), the Supreme Court of Florida has answered in
DeVaney v. Rumsch"6. the important question of whether professional ac-
tivities, in this case the practice of medicine, bring those exercising them
within the scope of the statutory term of doing business. The court
quashed the appellate decision13 and held that the distinction between
professional and business activities has no "applicability in the context of
the statute here involved. The determinative question is whether goods,
property or services are dealt with within the state for the pecuniary bene-
fit of the person providing or otherwise dealing in those goods, property
or services."'17 Consequently, "one who suffers a personal injury such as
is alleged in this case, is entitled to obtain constructive service of the
wrongdoer, regardless of whether the injury resulted from goods, services
or property transactions within the state."' The court also found that in
enacting section 48.181 of the Florida Statutes (1969), the legislature
intended that
any individual or corporation who has exercised the privilege of
practicing a profession or otherwise dealing in goods, services or
property, whether in a professional or nonprofessional capacity,
within the State in anticipation of economic gain be regarded as
operating a business or business venture for the purpose of ser-
vice ... in suits resulting from their activity with the state.139
In an action against a foreign corporation for injuries resulting from
transfusion of contaminated blood supplied by the corporation, the court
held that the corporation had transacted business in Florida in view of the
fact that for the last four years it systematically and regularly sold blood
or blood products to customers in Florida. 40 The court also admitted its
"strong feeling that public policy influences us to a holding that a supplier
of human blood for the purpose of transfusion into the body of citizens of
this state ought to be amenable to service of process.""' Adducing also
the recent ruling in DeVaney v. Rumsch, the court concluded that the
foreign corporation falls within the reach of Florida Statutes section
48.181 (1969).
The question whether a single act of the business type qualified under
section 48.181 of the Florida Statutes (1969) was tackled traditionally
in two ways: first, by relying on the "business venture" concept included
in section 48.181 of the Florida Statutes (1969); or, second, by consider-
135. 228 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1969).
136. Rumsch v. DeVaney, 218 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969); Survey IV at 447.
137. DeVaney v. Rumsch, 228 So.2d 904, 906 (Fla. 1969).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 907.
140. Sayet v. Interstate Blood Bank, Inc., 245 So.2d 142 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), followed
by Eder Instrument Co. v. Allen, 253 So.2d 962 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
141. Sayet v. Interstate Blood Bank, Inc., 245 So.2d 142, 144 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
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ing such act as "initiating a series of such acts."' 4 2 The first approach is
exemplified by duPont v. Rubin. 4 ' There the appellate court affirmed the
holding of the court below that the defendant who negotiated the purchase
of a motel in Florida, formed a corporation to take title to it, became the
sole stockholder and the principal officer directing corporate activities
(including the contract for the sale of the motel) was, "viewing the trans-
action in its entirety," engaged in a business venture.' Similarly, in Dans
v. Gran Habana Restaurant & Lounge, Inc.,145 the fact that the nonresi-
dent defendant opened a bank account in Miami, signed a contract to
purchase a restaurant, applied for an alcoholic beverage license, and exe-
cuted a lease of the premises, amounted to "engaging in a business
venture." Additionally, the subleasing of an aircraft, coupled with making
repairs and the hiring of a pilot, was held to be a business venture in C.I.
Inc. v. Travel Internationale, Ltd.146
The second approach was taken in Horace v. American National
Bank & Trust Co.147 The nonresident defendant contended that his only
act in Florida was to sign a guaranty. However, the defendant's reliance
on Odell v. Singer 4 ' was misplaced since the court, following the three
point analysis quoted above, found that the defendant personally appeared
at the bank to substitute his signature on an obligation; that he opened an
account in the plaintiff bank; that he signed several checks; and that he
executed and delivered to the bank a guaranty agreement. These actions
on the part of the defendant created the "necessary substantial connection
with the forum state so as to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable
and consonant with the due process tenets of fair play and substantial
justice."' 49 Moreover, the court felt that Florida has a "legitimate interest
in protecting financial transactions and business activities carried on
within its borders ... [and] a manifest interest in preserving the obliga-
tions of contracts as well as resolving suits resulting from such contracts
and transactions.' 15 0 The court concluded by emphasizing Florida's
continuing interest in securing reasonable business expectations;
similarly, the defendant has a continuing interest in the activities
of [the corporation involved] and should not complain if along
with the profits from such activities he must also accept process
resulting from such activities. 5'
In a similar vein, the court in Flying Saucers, Inc. v. Moody1 5 2 char-
142. Horace v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 251 So.2d 33, 36 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
143. 237 So.2d 795 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
144. Id. at 797.
145. 244 So.2d 157 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
146. 236 So.2d 441 (Fla. 1970).
147. 251 So.2d 33 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
148. 169 So.2d 851 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) ; see Survey II at 507.
149. Horace v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 251 So.2d 33, 37 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
150. Id. at 37.
151. Id.
152. 421 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1970).
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acterized one act on the part of the defendant as a "continual activity."
The court pointed out that the nonresident defendant-buyer sent his repre-
sentative to Miami to conduct a trial run of the vessel he was about to
buy, hired a captain to take care of it, had repairs made according to
specifications, and finally accepted the title to the vessel. In view of this
activity, the appellate court reversed the dismissal granted in the court
below and held that these activities fell "within the concept of 'minimum
contacts' which in turn brings it within the power of the state to reach out
to obtain service in the manner provided by the Florida statute."'" It may
be true that such activities coupled with connexity might meet minimum
due process standards; however, it is doubtful whether such activities meet
Florida's statutory requirement of engaging in business or business ven-
ture according to Florida Statutes section 48.181 (1969). It is also true
that the court has, at least on two occasions "categorically read" the
Florida statute as being liberally construed, even "as broadly as con-
sistent with due process."' 54 However, this alone does not eliminate the
doubt that in this case the vessel bought by defendant had any connection
with business, which would be required for the activity to be a transaction
"in anticipation of economic gain."' 55 The contrary appears from the dis-
closed facts: the hydrofoil was to be converted into a "luxurious day
cruiser."' 5 Even less persuasive is the reliance by the court on Florida
Statutes section 48.181(3) (1969), dealing with business through inter-
mediaries. The court was unable to "see why an agreement to convey
22,500 shares of stock does not come within the terminology of paragraph
3 which speaks of selling intangible personal property 'by any means
whatever.' "'I" Such an agreement, in the opinion of the court, would
authorize a conclusive presumption of "operating, conducting, engaging in
or carrying on a business venture in this state,"'58 the shares and $10,000
in cash representing the purchase price. However, the court has overlooked
that defendant was the buyer in the transaction while Florida Statutes
section 48.181(3) (1969) clearly applies to sellers and brings only sellers
within the reach of the statute.
Solicitation as a jurisdiction creating activity under section 48.181
of the Florida Statutes (1969) was at stake in Reader's Digest Association
v. State ex rel. Conner.'59 Affirming the lower court's dismissal of the
motion based on lack of jurisdiction, the appellate court again took the
153. Id. at 887.
154. Id. But see Casano v. WDSU-TV, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1970) which
held that "state law determines whether a corporation is subject to suit in that state, and
the federal decisions are important only in ascertaining whether the state law is within con-
stitutional bounds." Id. at 1135.
155. DeVaney v. Rumsch, 228 So.2d 904, 907 (Fla. 1969).
156. Flying Saucers, Inc. v. Moody, 421 F.2d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 1970).
157. Id. at 887. See Survey I at 283; Survey IV at 448. Cf. Clark v. Realty Inv. Center,
Inc., 252 So.2d 589 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
158. Flying Saucers, Inc. v. Moody, 421 F.2d 884, 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
159. 251 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
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constitutional instead of the statutory approach. As indicated repeat-
edly, not all activities which meet the due process requirements are,
by such fact, within the scope of a long-arm statute; only those activi-
ties which comply with the particular statutory identification of such
jurisdiction creating acts or activities come within the scope of the statute.
It must appear at first glance that under section 48.181 Florida Statutes
(1969) jurisdiction creating acts and activities are more restricted than
due process may allow. Not contacts generally, as specified in many long-
arm statutes of other states, but only those contacts which qualify as
business as recently defined fall within the scope of the statute. Therefore,
"mere'' solicitation may be an "unfortunate adjective that has been used
by courts in describing the solicitation rule for many years,"' 6° but the
question in this case is not, as the opinion suggests: whether the sine qua
non is minimum contacts which requires the "evaluation of the quantity
as well as the quality of the solicitation."'' The point to decide is whether
solicitation constitutes a business or business venture. Once this basic
question is answered in the affirmative, the constitutional issue may be
raised and discussed. Nevertheless, the court quite correctly found that
the solicitation undertaken by the defendant in Florida was a type of
"massive solicitation" by which it invaded the "offices and homes of more
than 10,000 Florida citizens ... urging them to participate in an alleged
lottery and purchase various goods and merchandise. .. In any case,
it may be said that solicitation by whatever means it is undertaken is so
closely related to an existing business, the expansion of a business, or the
establishment of a business is of such economic significance both to the
consumer as well as to business that it may no longer be considered an
insignificant collateral activity.
Transacting business through intermediaries, included in Florida
Statutes section 48.181(3) (1969), was at issue in Talcott v. Midnight
Publishing Corp."3 This case involved an action for libel against a Dela-
ware publisher with its principal place of business in Canada where the
libellous publication was printed. The publication was subsequently
distributed through independent wholesalers, one of them in Florida. The
court relied on Fawcet Publications, Inc. v. Rand 64 which established the
criterion that foreign publishers should be amenable to Florida courts
under Florida Statutes section 48.181(3) (1969) only if they retain some
160. Id. at 555.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 556. Exercise of control over the franchisee by a franchisor who was absent
from the state was held to amount to doing business in the state in Fashion Two Twenty, Inc.
v. Ralph & Reba, Inc., 254 So.2d 49 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). Defendant's corporate officer-agent
status combined with fraudulent activities of the Georgia corporation was held sufficient
to justify exercising jurisdiction over the individual defendant under FLA. STAT. § 48.161
(1969) since defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of engaging in business
in Florida, where the cause of action arose. Costin v. Olen, 449 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1971).
163. 427 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1970).
164. 144 So.2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962) ; see Survey I at 283.
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degree of control over the wholesalers or distributors or over the property
in their hands. Plaintiff urged that Fawcet.65 is no longer law in Florida
because of subsequent amendment of the statute and in view of the
decision in DeVaney v. Rumsch 6 6 which broaden the scope of Florida
Statutes section 48.181 (1969). However, the court found no change in
the perimeter of the statute had occurred.
Lack of jurisdiction creating activities on the part of the defendant
was ground for dismissal in the following cases. In South Dade Farms,
Inc. v. Investment Bank S.A.L., 6 7 the defendant bank issued letters of
credit in connection with land deals in Dade County, to be released from
escrow when the deal was "closed." Since the deal never materialized, the
letter of credit "did not become viable and would not constitute a doing
business within the provision 48.181 Fla. Stat. . .,l.8 Dismissal was af-
firmed in Wolfson v. Houston Post Co.'69 on the ground that the only
contact the defendant newspaper had with Florida was the sale of between
10,000 and 11,000 individual copies to unsolicited subscribers and the
sale of $38,601 worth of unsolicited advertising, representing 0.15 percent
of the total Sunday edition and 0.008 percent of the total daily edition.
The paper's advertising revenue realized from Florida amounted to less
that 0.153 percent of the total advertising revenues, with the Florida ad-
vertising lineage less than 0.091 percent of the total. Lack of jurisdiction
due to the lack of jurisdiction creating acts was found in Gordon v. John
Deere Co.' There the claim arose in 1965 from the operation of a
machine manufactured by the defendant foreign corporation and sold
through a Maryland distributor and a Virginia dealer to plaintiff. For dis-
missal, the court relied on two grounds: First, the cause of action did not
arise from a "transaction or operation connected with or incidental to
the activities"'' of the defendant, and second, the application of the
recently enacted Florida Statutes section 48.182 (Supp. 1970)172 would
amount to a retroactive application of a statute which, in the opinion of
the court, is not "merely remedial or procedural in nature,"'73 but imposes
a "new duty" and, therefore, operates "in the absence of positive legisla-
tive expression ...prospectively only.' 7 4 In any case, the rule is sup-
ported by a consistent line of Florida cases. 5
165. Id. Cf. Clark v. Realty Inc. Center, Inc., 252 So.2d 589 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
166. 228 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1969).
167. 244 So.2d 555 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
168. Id.
169. 441 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1971), distinguished in Eder Instruments Co. v. Allen, 253
So.2d 962 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). Cf. Buckley v. New York Times Co., 338 F.2d 470 (5th
Cir. 1964); New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
170. 320 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Fla. 1970), question certified, 451 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971)
(to Florida Supreme Court).
171. Id. at 295.
172. See section II, 12, infra.
173. Gordon v. John Deere Co., 320 F. Supp. 293, 295 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
174. Id. at 295.
175. See Survey I at 285; Survey III at 525. Cf. Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285
Minn. 250, 172 N.W.2d 292 (1969).
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A lack of jurisdiction creating activities on defendant's part,
formulated as 'minimum contacts' was found in Hamilton Brothers, Inc.
v. Peterson."6 The lack of contacts resulted in the dismissal of the action
brought by the corporate seller of a vessel stranded off the coast of Mexico
to defendant, a resident of Mexico. The only contacts with Florida appear
to be a telegram containing the offer which was sent to defendant who was
in Florida at the time, and the deposit, by defendant, of the purchase price
in a Florida bank. The bill of sale was to be delivered to defendant's at-
torney in Texas. "Under traditional contract principles if a contract was
entered into here [in Texas] it was not entered into in Florida and was
not to be consumated in Florida," particularly since defendant was to take
possession of the vessel off the coast of Mexico "as-is-where-is."' 17 The
result seems correct, but the court's reliance on Florida Towing Corp. v.
Oliver J. Olson Co.,'78 discussed in the following paragraph seems mis-
placed since there the action was dismissed because of lack of connexity.
The lack of connexity was decisive in Florida Towing Corp. v. Oliver
J. Olson Co."' The court found that the defendant California corporation
had never had a place of business, office, agents, or employees in Florida.
Nor did it at any time sell products, directly or indirectly, in the state. The
court also found that the contract to sell a barge was made and to be per-
formed in California. The wrongful act which defendant alleged, relieved
him from further performance of the contract and entitled him to the
return of the down payment also took place there. Relying on a line of
Florida cases, the court held that the cause of action did not arise out of
any activity of defendant in Florida and the defendant was, consequently
"regardless of whether it had done any business in Florida . . . not
amenable to service under the Florida long-arm statute.' i °
A rarely used Florida long-arm statute, namely Florida Statutes sec-
tion 48.071 (1969), was involved in Lipman v. Zuk.'8 ' The provision
allows service of process on a person in charge of a business transacted by
a ''natural person or partnership" in Florida or on their agents soliciting
orders in the state, provided the "action .. .aris[es] out of such busi-
ness.' 82 On the ground that "[n] onresident service of process statutes are
strictly construed," the court held that plaintiff had not carried the burden
of proof regarding defendant's business activities in the state. 83
In some instances, defective service may deprive the court of jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant. A particular aspect of service of process
under Florida Statutes section 48.161 (1969) upon the Secretary of State
176. 445 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1971).
177. Id. at 1336-37.
178. 426 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1970); Cf. Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. Donnelly, 402 F.2d
400 (5th Cir. 1968) (defendant's risk in taking default judgment by not appearing does not
deny him the right to assert lack of jurisdiction).
179. 426 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1970).
180. Id. at 901.
181. 244 So.2d 496 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
182. Id. at 497, quoting FLA. STAT. § 48.071 (1969).
183. Lipman v. Zuk, 244 So.2d 496, 497 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
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was litigated in Bomann Golf, Inc. v. Cosmos Industries, Inc. s4 The court
held that the previous interpretation of this section, namely that plaintiff
has to await the return from the Secretary of State in order to make the
supplementary notice to the defendant of the fact that service was made
on the Secretary, was changed due to a slight amendment in section 48.181
of the Florida Statutes made in 1970. In view of this change, the court
concluded that service is to be held completed with the service of the Sec-
retary of State while the subsequent notice of this service on defendant
is a separate requirement which is only an "assurance of procedural due
process."' 5 As a consequence, service is "effective without notice of ser-
vice to defendant."' 86 Another aspect of such service was at issue in Parish
Mortgage Corp. v. Davis,"7 namely the statutory injunction of "forth-
with." The default judgment against the Louisiana corporation was set
aside and service quashed because the notice of service on the Secretary
of State under Florida Statutes section 48.161 (1969) was not mailed until
37 days after service on the Secretary of State and 17 days after return
date fixed.
Service of process on a foreign corporation qualified to do business in
Florida may be had on a resident agent appointed for such service under
Florida Statutes section 48.091 (1969), without showing that the "cause
of action against the corporation arose out of its activities in the state
..8 Discussing the Illinois Central'89 and Zirin'9 0 cases, the court
erroneously assumed that the requirement of connexity was "raised by ju-
dicial fiat,"' 9 ' while, in fact, the requirement is statutory. By contrast,
the court correctly refused to apply the constitutional standards ex-
pressed in minimum contacts and connexity to the rule expressed in
Florida Statutes section 48.091 (1969) on the ground that
such minimum contacts would seem patently established where,
as here, the foreign corporation has actually qualified under Flor-
ida law to transact business in this state and has appointed a
resident agent for service of process as required by F.S. 1969,
sec. 48.091 F.S.A. 92
184. 325 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Fla. 1971). Cf. Clark v. Realty Inv. Center, Inc., 252 So.2d
589 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
185. Bomann Golf, Inc. v. Cosmos Industries, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 704, 706 (S.D. Fla.
1971).
186. Id.
187. 251 So.2d 342 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). Provisions for substituted service must be strictly
construed. Costin v. Olen, 449 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1971).
188. Junction Bit & Tool Co. v. Institutional Mort. Co., 240 So.2d 879 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1970).
189. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Simari, 191 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1966) ; see Survey III at 521.
190. Zurin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 128 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1961) ; see Survey I at 284.
191. Junction Bit & Tool Co. v. Institutional Mort. Co., 240 So.2d 879, 882 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1970).
192. Id. The 1971 legislature has amended FLA. STAT. § 48.091 (1969) by Fla. Laws
1971, ch. 71-269, § 1, to require that foreign corporations qualifying to do business in Florida
designate not only a resident agent, but also the "street address of the office, place of business
or location," for service of process. The descending order of service under FLA. STAT. § 48.091
[Vol. XXVI
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4. UNAUTHORIZED FOREIGN INSURERS
Two recent cases deal with the timing and mode of constructive ser-
vice of process on an unauthorized insurer through the Commissioner of
Insurance. The first case, American Liberty Insurance Co. v. Maddox,'
started from the proposition that statutes regulating service must be
strictly complied with and held that an insurer must plead within 20 days,
counted not from the day the Commissioner mailed the copy of process to
the insurer but from the day the insurer received it. The other case, Home
Life Insurance Co. v. Regueira,9 4 held that the notice mailed by the Com-
missioner of Insurance to the foreign insurer, after having received service
of process, must in fact contain a copy of summons and of the complaint.
The attempt on the part of the plaintiff to uphold service on the ground
that the Commissioner is the "resident agent" of the insurer according to
Florida Statutes section 624.0221 (1969) was unsuccessful. This section
provides that service of process on the Commissioner "shall be the only
method of service" because Florida Statutes section 624.0222 (1969)
further provides that "process served upon the commissioner and copy
thereof forwarded as in this section provided shall for all purposes con-
stitute valid and binding service thereof upon the insurer."' 93 The court
rejected this argument.
5. NONRESIDENT CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS
Amendments enacted in the 1971 legislative session have no bearing
on jurisdictional problems. No other developments may be reported.
6. PARTNERSHIPS
No new developments may be reported.
7. LAND DEVELOPERS
No new developments may be reported.
8. NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS
No new developments may be reported.
(1969) is applicable to domestic corporations. Ludlum Enterprises, Inc. v. Outdoor Media,
Inc., 250 So.2d 649 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971) ; see Survey IV at 453.
The inability of plaintiff's attorney to locate certain absent defendants does not con-
stitute a flagrant disobedience of court's order that the action would be dismissed unless
plaintiff has obtained sufficient service of process upon them by a certain date and does not
justify the entry of a final judgment on the merits. Canada v. Matthews, 449 F.2d 253 (5th
Cir. 1971).
193. 238 So.2d 154 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
194. 243 So.2d 460 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
195. FLA. STAT. § 624.0222(3) (1969) (emphasis added).
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9. SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
The jurisdictional provisions contained in the 1969 statutory amend-
ments, reported previously, 96 have now been included in Florida Statutes
as sections 665.501(1) to (5) (1969).
10. FOREIGN DEALERS IN SECURITIES
The 1971 legislative session has amended Florida Statutes section
517.10 (1969) dealing with consent to service.197 The changes affect its
reference to Florida Statutes section 517.08 (1969) regarding application
for registration by coordination, and a newly added section dealing with
the application for registration by announcement under Florida Statutes
section 517.091 (1969). The phrase "whether made by an issuer or regis-
tered dealer" was omitted. The subsequent provision, Florida Statutes
section 517.10 (1969), that in case
the issuer is not domiciled in this state, there shall be filed with
such application the irrevocable written consent of the issuer
that in suits.., growing out of the violation of any provision of
this chapter, the service on the department of any notice, pro-
cess or pleading therein ... shall be as valid and binding as if
due service had been made on the issuer
remains unchanged.
11. CAR DEALERS
A new long-arm statute was enacted in the 1970 legislative session.'
According to Florida Statutes section 320.61 (Supp. 1970), "no manu-
facturer, factory branch, factory representative, distributor, or importer
. . . shall engage in business as such" without a license. Acceptance of
such license, according to Florida Statutes, section 320.615 (Supp. 1970)
shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such person of
the secretary of state as the agent of such person upon whom
may be served all lawful process in any action arising out of any
transaction or operation connected with or incidental to any
activities of such person carried on under such license ....
Service is to be performed "in accordance with and in the same man-
ner as now provided for service of process upon nonresidents under the
provisions of chapter 48.2'"1 Difficulties will arise not only from this refer-
ence to the difficult to manage service provisions of chapter 48 but also
from unavoidable overlapping with Florida Statutes section 48.181 (1969).
196. See Survey IV at 457.
197. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-96(5). See Survey IV at 458.
198. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-424, adding FLA. STAT. § 320.615 (Supp. 1970).
199. FLA. STAT. § 320.615 (Supp. 1970), amending FLA. STAT. §§ 48.011-.23 (1969).
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12. TORTS
Still another fact situation became the basis for long-arm jurisdiction
during the survey period: the commission of a tort outside of Florida
with consequences within the state. The enactment by the 1970 legisla-
ture200 of the new section 48.182 is prefaced by a lengthy preamble stating
as underlying legislative considerations the "expanding volume of inter-
state and international commerce transacted in Florida," and the possibil-
ity of injuries and losses to Florida residents and visitors
as result of compensable wrongful acts committed outside of the
state by nonresidents or their agents who derive substantial reve-
nue from interstate or international commerce and who should
reasonably expect that such wrongful acts might have some in-
jurious consequences in this state." [In order to secure compensa-
tion for such losses, the] "courts of this state shall have personal
jurisdiction over such nonresidents for wrongful acts committed
outside the state which cause injury, loss, or damage to persons
within Florida to the extent due process considerations permit."1
20 1
To facilitate an analysis of this poorly drafted statute, it seems advis-
able to project it against its precursors adopted in other states. Among
these precursors are the New York amendment to section 302 (3) Civil
Practice Law and Rules,2"2 and the Uniform Interstate and International
Procedure Act,20 which has been adopted in a number of states. First of
all, it must be kept in mind that these jurisdictions also have statutes based
on commission of torts within these states as a jurisdiction creating act.
This existing jurisdiction was implemented by a new one, the commission
of a tort outside the state with injurious consequences within the forum
state, coupled with additional requirements. Among these additional
requirements are: doing or soliciting business or "any persistent course
of conduct" within the forum state; substantial revenue from goods or
services supplied in the forum state; foreseeability on the part of the
200. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-90, adding FLA. STAT. § 48.182 (Supp. 1970).
201. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-90.
202. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 590, amending N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302(c) (Gilbert-
Bliss 1963); see generally Homburger & Laufer, Expanding Jurisdiction over Foreign Torts:
The 1966 Amendment of New York's Long-Arm Statute, 16 BUFF. L. REV. 67 (1966). A
fraudulent conveyance in New York by a defendant, domiciled in Florida, has been held to
be with N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 302(a) (2) (Gilbert Bliss 1963). Zindwer v. Ehrens, 34 App.
Div. 2d 1035, 311 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
203. Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act [98 U.L.A. § 1.03(a)], applied
in Lauck v. E.C.K. Chivers & Associates, 320 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Buckley v.
New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967) (Connecticut); McKee v. Southern R.R.,
327 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ga. 1971), Griffin v. Air South, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga.
1971) (substantially in regard to torts in Georgia); Fisher v. Albany Mach. & Supply Co.,
246 So.2d 218 (La. App. 1971), Boykin v. Lindenkranar, 252 So.2d 467 (La. App. 1971);
Mark v. Obear & Sons, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 373 (D. Mass. 1970). See generally Leflar, Act 101:
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, 17 ARK. L. Rav. 118 (1963); Comment,
In personam Jurisdiction over Nonresident Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 63
MIcHa. L. REV. 1028 (1965).
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nonresident wrongdoer of consequences within the forum state; and
the fact that the nonresident derives substantial revenue from interstate
or international commerce.
The requirement of a wrongful act outside of the forum state which
has consequences within that state, including connexity, is-with some
modifications-common to this type of long-arm statute which makes
jurisdiction run with the product. The additional contacts show consider-
able variations not only in regard to their number and nature but also in
regard to the single or combined alternatives in which they appear. These
additional contacts may apply cumulatively or alternatively; the later
variant may also establish sets of such contacts with alternatives set up
therein to be used alternatively or cumulatively.
The New York statute has established two sets of additional contacts.
The first, listed under subsection (1) of section 302(3) of Civil Practice
Law and Rules contains two alternatives: first, regular business or solici-
tation or engaging in "any other persistent course of conduct," and, sec-
ond, the fact that the nonresident "derives substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed or services rendered." Both alternatives require that
the acts take place in the forum state. The other set of alternatives enu-
merated under subsection (ii) of section 302 (3) Civil Practice Law and
Rules offers a cumulation of contacts, namely that the nonresident "ex-
pects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the
state," coupled with the fact that he also derives "substantial revenue
from interstate or international commerce," regardless of whether such
commerce has any relation to the forum state.
The Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act has adopted
a much simpler scheme. Out-of-state tortious acts with consequences
within the forum state will support long-arm jurisdiction provided they
are accompanied by one of the three alternative contacts with the forum
state: doing or soliciting business; engaging in any other "persistent
course of conduct;" or, the fact that the nonresident defendant "derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered."
The Uniform Act requires connexity with the wrongful out-of-state act.
On the contrary, foreseeability is not used as one of the additional alternate
contacts.
In the light of these models, the Florida statute 0 4 has adopted the
obvious general premise formulated as the requirement that a nonresident
"person, firm or corporation" directly or indirectly through agents "com-
mits a wrongful act outside of the state which causes injury, loss or damage
204. FLA. STAT. § 48.182 (Supp. 1970). The statute is not retroactive. Gordon v. John
Deere Co., 320 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Fla. 1970), and Hyler v. State, 253 So.2d 721 (Fla. Ist
Dist. 1971). The case also raised the issue of whether a breach of contract is a wrongful
act within the meaning of the statute, or "should be considered not to be a wrongful act as
contemplated therein, since a contracting party can elect not to perform a contract, al-
though to so elect may subject the defaulting party to liability," Id. at 724. The question,
however, was not answered.
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to persons or property within this state." This general premise is coupled
with two additional cumulative contacts, one of which requires that the
nonresident wrongdoer "expects or should reasonably expect the act to
have consequences in this state . . ." Compared with the models just
summarized, it appears that the requirement of foreseeability is expanded
in the Florida Statutes to include, as an alternative within this contact, the
foreseeability of consequences in "any other state or nation . . ,o In
addition of such foreseeability, the nonresident wrongdoer must derive
"substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce, ' 20 6 re-
gardless of whether such activity is related to Florida.
Compared with analogous statutes in force in other states, the Florida
statute reaches considerably farther since a nonresident who committed a
tort outside of Florida, who may not have foreseen consequences in Flor-
ida, and who is engaged in interstate or international commerce unrelated
to Florida, appears to come within the reach of Florida Statutes section
48.182 (Supp. 1970), provided his out-of-state tortious act has caused in-
jurious consequences in Florida. This possibility may run afoul of the
constitutional standard which requires that this type of long-arm statute
reach a nonresident in a one-act tortious situation only if the nonresident
has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business
within the forum state.2 °7
Finally, it is to be pointed out that the statute retains the requirement
of connexity between the out-of-state wrongful act, its local consequences,
and the claim which arises by referring to actions or proceedings "arising
from any such act."
The Florida statute also contains provisions dealing with service of
process on the nonresident wrongdoer. However, considerable difficulties
are bound to arise. First, the statute provides that the nonresident defen-
dant may be "personally served."2 Taken at its face, the provision is
inconsistent with defendant's nonresident status; if the provision aims at
service in a foreign jurisdiction, then it should say so. The second diffi-
culty, which is more serious, originates from the provision that service
shall be "in the same manner as on nonresident who, in person or through
an agent has committed a wrongful act within the state."20 9 Since Florida
has never adopted a long-arm statute dealing with in-state torts, the refer-
ence to such nonexisting provision makes the new statute unworkable,
except in situations where torts have been committed in conjunction with
any of the already adopted long-arm jurisdictional contacts, for example,
205. FLA. STAT. § 48.182 (Supp. 1970).
206. FLA. STAT. § 48.182 (Supp. 1970).
207. "[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant pur-
posefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus
invoking the benefits and protection of its laws," Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958); cf. Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1 (Goldberg, Circuit Justice,
1965), reh. denied, 382 U.S. 1002 (1966).
208. FLA. STAT. § 48.182 (Supp. 1970).
209. FLA. STAT. § 48.182 (Supp. 1970).
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business or business venture. As shown in this study,21° recent Florida
cases involving marketing of defective blood 211 or causing damage by
medical malpractice21 2 have included such activities within doing business
in Florida under Florida Statutes section 48.181 (1969). Within these
situations, the new statute presents a duplication; outside of them, the
unfortunate reference to a nonexisting provision might deprive it of any
effectiveness.
The new statute concludes by providing that a nonresident deceased's
executor or administrator will be subject to personal service in the same
manner as a nonresident, and furthermore, that this section does not apply
to a "cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act."21
Two final remarks seem to be in order. First, the wrongfulness of the
out-of-state act will probably be determined by the traditional lex loci;
for jurisdictional purposes the fact that the consequences took place in the
forum state will suffice, regardless of nonresident defendant's substantive
liability. The second remark turns to the constitutional posture of the
new statute. It is reasonable to expect that-except for one aspect indi-
cated above-the one-act statute combined with connexity will survive
attacks based on due process.214
13. PROPERTY
Florida lacks a long-arm statute based on the fact that the nonresi-
dent defendant maintains property within the state. The only exception
appears in Florida Statute section 49.19 (1969). This section is based not
only on operation and navigation of an "aircraft, or a boat, ship, barge or
other watercraft within the state,"2 5 but also their mere "maintenance"
in the state.216 In any case, property-corporeal and incorporeal-may
always be used as basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction.
B. Jurisdiction in rem and quasi in rem
Actions in rem are those which "seek not to impose personal liability
but rather to effect the interests of persons in a specific thing .... Typi-
cal modern examples are actions for partition or foreclosure of a lien or
210. See section II, A, 3, supra.
211. Sayet v. Interstate Blood Bank, Inc., 245 So.2d 142 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
212. DeVaney v. Rumsch, 228 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1969). In Illinois, a tort committed out-
of-state with consequences within the state is held to have been committed within the state.
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
Cf. Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969) ; see also Survey IV at 442
n.68.
213. FLA. STAT. § 48.182 (Supp. 1970).
214. See Survey I at 278-79.
215. FLA. STAT. § 48.19 (Supp. 1970).
216. For Florida corporations as defendants in other jurisdictions, see, e.g., O'Hare Int'l
Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1971) (Oklahoma); Sarno v. Florida E. Coast Ry.,
327 F. Supp. 506 (D. Mass. 1971); Lauck v. E.C.K. Chivers & Assoc., 320 F. Supp. 463
(E.D. Ark. 1970); Ferguson v. Kwik-Check, 308 F. Supp. 78 (D.V.I. 1970) (Virgin Islands);
State ex rel. White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Ore. 121, 448 P.2d 571 (1968).
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to quiet title to real estate." '217 Even though the "concept of an in rem
action has been extended to those actions which seek to affect status, for
example, divorce actions,"21 the court held that an extramarital paternity
action is one in personam and does not admit of service of process by
publication under Florida Statutes section 49.011 (1969), on the ground
that in such a suit there is "nothing to affect the interests of persons in a
specific thing or res. ' 19
As expressed recently in T. J. K. v. N. B., a quasi in rem action is
designed to "enforce a personal claim against the defendant to the extent
of applying the thing or property seized in satisfaction of the claim," with
the recovery limited to the attached res.2 The quasi in rem mode of es-
tablishing jurisdiction became practical in cases where the res to be
attached for jurisdictional purposes is a claim,221 particularly against in-
surance companies. In the leading New York case, Seider v. Roth,2
residents of New York were injured in a car accident in Vermont due to
the negligence of a Canadian. In their action brought in a New York
court, plaintiffs attached the defendant's claim against his insurer. The
underlying question, whether such a duty to defend and indemnify was
a "debt" within the pertinent New York statute, was answered in the
affirmative. In relation to Florida as the lex loci delicti the Seider doctrine
was tested in Barrios v. Dade County,22 already discussed.
C. Forum non conveniens
The doctrine that forum non conveniens is an "equitable doctrine
applied when citizens of a foreign state seek to litigate their controversies
in another state where the controversy between them arose outside of the
11224 sttd225state in which they seek to litigate,' was restated in Ganem v. Issa.
The court also remarked that it was unable to find a case "espousing the
proposition that in the absence of statute the courts of this state may in-
voke the doctrine to effect the transfer of a cause of action from one court
in this state to another court within the state for the purpose of trial con-
venience.
' 226
217. T.J.K. v. N.B., 237 So.2d 592 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
218. Id. at 594.
219. Id. at 595; accord, Hartford v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 2d 447, 304 P.2d 1 (1956).
220. T.J.K. v. N.B., 237 So.2d 592 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
221. Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185 (1886).
222. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966); contra, Gov't Employees
Ins. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1970); McHugh v. Paley, 63 Misc. 2d 1092, 314
N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (Seider in a Bahamas accident); Robinson v. Loyola Found.,
Inc., 236 So.2d 154 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970) (claims amenable to attachment under Florida law).
223. 310 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ; see also Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp.,
326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (foreign attachment); and Maryland Tuna Corp. v.
M. S. Benares, 429 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1970) (process of maritime attachment and garnish-
ments).
224. Atlantic Coast R.R. v. Ganey, 125 So.2d 576, 579 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
225. 225 So.2d 564 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
226. Atlantic Coast R.R. v. Ganey, 125 So.2d 576, 580 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
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In Unterweser,227 the motion to decline jurisdiction on the basis of
forum non conveniens was denied by the trial court. Affirming the deci-
sion, the appellate court took into account the following factors: (1) that
the towage contract envisioned a long voyage, from Mississippi to the
Adriatic, with "potential exposure to the jurisdiction of numerous states,"
the flotilla nevertheless would never escape the "Fifth Circuit's mare
nostrum;" (2) that the damage on board the towed vessel occurred in
"close proximity to the district court;" (3) that a considerable number of
potential witnesses reside in the area of the Gulf of Mexico; (4) that
preparations for the voyage were made within the jurisdiction and the
inspection of the damage and repair work was conducted there; (5) that
the testimony of crewmen residing in Germany would be available in the
proceedings; and, (6) that although the parties had agreed to litigate their
claims in England, the only other nation having significant contacts with
the controversy was Germany because England's only relationship was the
"designation of her courts in the forum clause." Moreover, the owner of
the drilling barge to be towed was a United States corporate citizen. Fi-
nally, the court took into consideration the fact that a "remand of the case
to a foreign court would result in a significant disadvantage to the owner
since the exculpatory provisions contained in the towage contract would
be held "prima facie valid and enforceable by an English court," a bar
which the owner's "own convenient courts would not countenance."
22 8
D. Access to Courts
In addition to cases and statutes discussed previously, 229 the provi-
sion dealing with unauthorized foreign insurers provides that such in-
surers may not
institute, file, or maintain, or cause to be instituted, filed, or main-
tained, any suit, action, or proceeding in this state to enforce any
right, claim or demand arising out of any insurance transaction
in this state .. 23
except in regard to transactions listed in Florida Statutes section 624.0201
(1969). Transactions under the latter statute may be undertaken without
a "certificate of authority."
E. Federal Courts
It is well established that in diversity cases state jurisdictional rules
determine whether a defendant is amenable to federal courts.28' Once the
227. In re Unterweser Reederei, GmbH, 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970). CI. Noto v. Cia
Secula de Armanento, 310 F. Supp. 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ; see also Fiorenza v. U.S. Steel Int'l,
Ltd., 311 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
228. In re Unterweser Reederei, GmbH, 428 F.2d 888, 894-95 (5th Cir. 1970).
229. See Survey IV at 460.
230. FLA. STAT. § 626.0502 (1969).
231. Walker v. Savell, 335 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1964). In a Clayton Act [15 U.S.C. § 15
(1970)] action, the court was held to be without jurisdiction over one defendant since he was
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question of state law is decided in favor of jurisdiction, the constitutional
issue may arise to be tested against the due process standard.282
Even though constitutional questions are within the specific federal
domain, a federal court will not hear constitutional issues which have been
presented and decided in state courts. 83
F. Arbitration
In Shearson, Hammill & Co. v. Vouis,28 4 the court again refused to
comply with the statutory provision that arbitration agreements dealing
not only with existing controversies but also with those "thereafter arising
between them relating to such contract ... ,,285 are valid and irrevocable.
The ground for this refusal was that such statutory provision is designed
to "create an exception to the well settled doctrine that an agreement to
arbitrate a dispute in the future will not be enforced as an attempt to oust
the court's jurisdiction."2 6 In the present case the problem has an interest-
ing twist because parties agreed that their arbitration agreement "shall be
governed by the laws of the State of New York. '28 7 Even though the
plaintiff urged that if the Florida statute were applied, the same result
would be reached as under the chosen New York law, the court maintained
its opposition to the Florida statute.
The recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is now
regulated, at least between the contracting countries, by the Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, signed
at New York on June 10, 1958, ratified by the United States,288 and imple-
mented by federal legislation.289 In essence, the Convention deals both with
agreements to arbitrate and with arbitral awards. In order to qualify for
not amenable to service pursuant to FLA. STAT. §§ 48.081, 48.161, 48.181 (1969). Manufacturers
Buyers Corp. v. El Dorado Tire Co., 324 F. Supp. 225 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
232. Casano v. WDSU-TV, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1970), following Eyerly
Aircraft v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969) ; see Survey IV at 442.
233. Haas v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank, 442 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1971) (lack of diversity in an
injunction suit) ; Sullens v. Carroll, 308 F. Supp. 311 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (no jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (1970) in malpractice action against attorney appointed in federal
court) ; Stamicarbon v. Escambia Chem. Corp., 430 F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1970) (evidence under
FEn. R. Civ. P. 43(a)); Eitel v. Faircloth, 311 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1970); Harry Rich
Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 306 F. Supp. 1114 (S.D. Fla. 1969) (amenability to Florida
courts decisive in transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970)).
234. 247 So.2d 733 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
235. FLA. STAT. § 682.02 (1969).
236. Shearson, Hammill & Co. v. Vouis, 247 So.2d 733, 735 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
237. Id. at 734.
238. [1970] 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 [330 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958)] [hereinafter
cited as Convention]. Text also found in Springer, The United Nations Convention on Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 INT'L LAw 320 (1969), and in 7
INT'L LEG. MAT. 1042 (1968). See Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70
YALE L.J. 1049 (1960) ; Sultan, The United Nations Arbitration Convention and United States
Policy, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 807 (1959); Comment, The United Nations Conference on Com-
mercial Arbitration, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 414 (1959).
239. An Act to implement the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Implementing Act].
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international recognition, i.e., to be given effect in the contracting coun-
tries, such agreements must be in writing and "submit to arbitration all or
any of the differences which have arisen or which may arise between [the
parties] in respect [to] a defined legal relationship, whether contractual
or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration." 4
The Convention authorizes courts of the contracting countries to "refer
the parties to arbitration, unless it finds [the] agreement [to be] null and
void, inoperative or incapable to be performed." 4' The resulting arbitral
award will have to be recognized and enforced provided it was "made in
the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and
enforcement of such awards are sought... ,242 Consequently, the Conven-
tion applies to awards "not considered as domestic awards in the State
where their recognition and enforcement are sought,"24 an alternative
not further clarified but implemented by the federal enactment. 44 Con-
tracting countries may further restrict the applicability of the Convention
according to either of the two alternatives offered in article I, paragraph
(3). One alternative is to apply the Convention to awards "made only in
the territory of another Contracting State ... "4 on the basis of reciproc-
ity. The other alternative is to apply the Convention only to differences
arising from legal relationships "considered as commercial under the na-
tional law of the State making such declaration. 46
Contracting countries are bound to enforce arbitral awards in accord-
ance with their procedural rules, but never under conditions which would
be more onerous than those applicable to domestic awards. 247 The applica-
tion for enforcement must be accompanied with the "authenticated original
award or a duly certified copy . ..,4' accompanied by an equally qualified
agreement to arbitrate. Recognition and enforcement may be denied
2 4
1
whenever the objecting party proves that
(1) the parties to the agreement were "under the law applicable to
them, under some incapacity," or the agreement is invalid "under the law
to which parties have subjected it ...25 or under the law of the place of
making; or
(2) the party against which the award is to be enforced received no
prior notice of the appointment of the arbitrator; or of the arbitration
proceedings; or was "otherwise unable to present his case ... ,,' or
240. Convention, supra note 238, art. II. para. 1.
241. Convention, supra note 238, art. II, para. 3.
242. Convention, supra note 238, art. I, para. 1.
243. Convention, supra note 238, art. I, para. 1.
244. Implementing Act, 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1970).
245. Convention, supra note 238, art. I, para. 3.
246. Convention, supra note 238, art. I, para. 3.
247. Convention, supra note 238, art. III.
248. Convention, supra note 238, art. IV, para 1.
249. Convention, supra note 238, art. V.
250. Convention, supra note 238, art. V, para. 1(a).
251. Convention, supra note 238, art. V, para. 1(b).
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(3) the award deals with a dispute "not contemplated by or not fal-
ling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains deci-
sions on matters beyond the scope '2 ' 2 of such submission, provided that if
matters may be separated, the proper part of the award will survive; or
(4) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure
was not "in accordance with the agreement. . ." of failing such agreement,
not in accordance with the "[1]aw of the country where the arbitration
took place;"2, or
(5) the award is not yet final or has been set aside or suspended.
Recognition and enforcement may also be denied if the "competent au-
thority" of the country where recognition and enforcement are sought,254
finds that:
(a) the "subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement
by arbitration under the law of that country; )255 or
(b) the recognition or enforcement of the award would be "contrary
to the public policy of that country.
' 215 6
In case an application to set aside or suspend the award is made, the
competent authority may "adjourn the decision on the enforcement . . .
and may also ... order the other party to give suitable security.
'2
The Act to implement the Convention, enacted as chapter 2 of title
9 of the United States Code, takes effect unless "in conflict with this
chapter or the Convention as ratified. ... .s The enactment limits the
effect of the Convention in accordance with its article I, paragraph (3)
to those undertakings "considered as commercial, including a transaction,
contract, or agreement described in section 2' '259 of the Convention, thus
incurring the difficulty arising out of the fact that in this country-as
distinguished from civil law jurisdictions-the notion 'commercial' is not
statutorily defined, nor is it reliably ascertainable from common law. Ex-
cluded from coverage are arbitration agreements and awards between
United States nationals "unless that relationship involves property located
abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other
reasonable relation with one or more foreign states."26° In this connection,
a corporation is considered a "citizen of the United States if it is incorpo-
rated or has its principal place of business in the United States."26'
In regard to jurisdiction in matters covered by the Convention as
implemented, any action or proceeding is deemed to "arise under the laws
and treaties of the United States," and the district courts have original
252. Convention, supra note 238, art. V, para. 1(c).
253. Convention, supra note 238, art. V, para. 1(d).
254. Convention, supra note 238, art. V, para. 1(e).
255. Convention, supra note 238, art. V, para. 2(a).
256. Convention, supra note 238, art. V, para. 2(b).
257. Convention, supra note 238, art. VI.
258. Implementing Act, 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1970).
259. Implementing Act, 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1970).
260. Implementing Act, 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1970).
261. Implementing Act, 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1970).
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jurisdiction "regardless of the amount in controversy. 2 6 2 Venue lies in
the district where "save for the arbitration agreement" the litigation could
be brought, or designated "as the place of arbitration if such place is
within the United States. '263 This provision excludes arbitrations and
awards arising out of claims which could not have been litigated in the
United States as well as awards entered abroad.
Since jurisdiction in these matters is concurrent with state courts,
cases filed in the latter may be removed to the federal court "embracing
the place where the action or proceeding is pending." '264 The routine pro-
cedure for removal shall apply, except that the "ground for removal ...
need not appear on the face of the complaint but may be shown in the peti-
tion for removal. ' 26 For the purposes of the Convention, a removed action
or proceeding shall be "deemed to have been brought in the district court
to which it is removed.
266
Arbitration will be compelled by an order directing that "arbitration
be held in accordance with the agreement at any place therein provided
• . ." regardless of whether this place is "within or without the United
States. '267 The court also may appoint arbitrators "in accordance with the
provisions of the agreement. ' 26 8 Parties may, within three years after an
arbitral award is made, apply to the competent court for an "order con-
firming the award as against any other party to the arbitration," unless a
ground listed in the Convention warrants other disposition. 269
In relation to agreements to arbitrate covered by the Convention, the
Florida Arbitration Code, enacted in 195 7, will be the object of significant
changes. ° In any case, the "well settled doctrine" denying effect to an
agreement to arbitrate future controversies will this time have to yield to
the supremacy clause of the federal constitution.
III. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
In an action in Florida upon a Texas default judgment, defendant
admitted that he received notice of the pendency of the proceedings, that
he did not attack jurisdiction by alleging fraud, nor did he submit to the
Texas court acting under its long-arm statute any evidence that he never
transacted business in Texas. The district court of appeals upheld271 the
262. Implementing Act, 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1970).
263. Implementing Act, 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1970).
264. Implementing Act, 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
265. Implementing Act, 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
266. Implementing Act, 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
267. Implementing Act, 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1970).
268. Implementing Act, 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1970).
269. Implementing Act, 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1970).
270. FLA. STAT. §§ 682.01-.22 (1969). The impact of the Convention (supra note 238)
on the FLORIDA ARBITRATION CODE will be discussed in the next Survey. On recognition and
enforcement of awards outside of the Convention, see Bayitch, Treaty Law of Private Arbitra-
tion, 10 AM. J. 188 (1955); Domke, American Arbitral Awards: Enforcement in Foreign
Countries, 1965 ILL. L. FORUm 399.
271. Rigot v. Holbein, 233 So.2d 458 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
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lower court's judgment for the plaintiffs with the exception of the award
of exemplary or punitive damages. However, the Florida Supreme Court272
reversed this part of the decision on the ground that the Texas judgment
was not based in a penal statute but "on general common law liability for
false, fraudulent and malicious representations on the part of defendant
which wrongfully induced plaintiffs to their injury to enter into a franchis-
ing agreement with defendant." 78 The court concluded that the enforce-
ment of the Texas judgment "does not violate the principle that penal laws
of a state are not enforceable in another .*.."I" because the award made
by the Texas court was "not to punish defendant for an offense against the
state or general public but to give plaintiffs redress or reparation by way of
punitive or exemplary damages for the private wrong suffered."2 5 The
court added that an "exception to the constitutional guarantee of full
faith and credit is that penal statutes of one state do not have extrater-
ritorial effect.1
2 76
It appears that the court considered as decisive the question of
whether the common law rule granting punitive and exemplary damages
is penal in nature and as such may not be applied extra-territorially.
However, two kinds of situations must be distinguished in this respect.
The first situation is the choice-of-law situation where a sister-state court,
following its own conflict rule, is faced with the application of a foreign
rule of law which might be penal in nature and therefore could be denied
application in spite of the full faith and credit due to sister state laws,
statutory and decisional. A different situation arises when a claim has been
reduced to judgment in a sister-state and is before the court of another
jurisdiction and claims full faith and credit. There the hands of the court
are bound since the demand is no more based on the original cause of
action but is one arising from the judgment. This prevents the court from
looking behind the judgment, not only to the rendering court's own com-
pliance vel non with the applicable law, but also to the possibility that
extraterritorial effect which may be indirectly given to a rule of the adjudi-
cating forum which otherwise might be excluded from extraterritorial
effect.277 As stated in Milwaukee County v. M. E. White:
A cause of action on a judgment is different from that upon
which the judgment was entered. In a suit upon a money judg-
ment for a civil cause of action, the validity of the claim upon
which it was founded is not open to inquiry, whatever its gen-
esis.
275
The reliance by the court on lames-Dickinson Mortgage Co. v.
272. Holbein v. Rigot, 245 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1971).




277. Faunteroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
278. 296 U.S. 268, 275 (1935).
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Harry 9 and Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. 210 might have been proper in
choice-of-law situations as necessary to substantiate the definition of a
penal statute. The reliance on Huntington v. Attrill,25' however, in this
full faith and credit situation is not persuasive because of the inherent
weakness of that case and the fact that Huntington is overshadowed by the
quoted English case282 which determined the effect to be given to a
New York judgment in Canada. However, the court in Huntington over-
looked the decisive difference, namely, that the English case is one of
international recognition where the discrimination against foreign penal
statutes enjoys free range while in the case before them the question to be
decided was one of full faith and credit to a sister state judgment.2s8 These
remarks do not suggest a different result, but they might indicate a better
way to reach it.
Estoppel by judgment was at issue in Bardwell v. Langston.2 4 There
the plaintiff, who was injured in a Louisiana collision, succeeded in her
action filed in a Louisiana federal court against the driver of the car in-
volved in the accident. When she subsequently instituted an action in a
federal court in Florida against the insurer of a motor company which was
believed by defendant to have been the owner of the car at the time of the
accident, the court held-without the motor company participating in the
proceedings-that the company did not own the car. Then the plaintiff
instituted an action in a Florida state court directly against the motor
company insisting on its ownership. The defense countered with res
judicata. The appellate court affirmed judgment for defendant by reason
of estoppel by judgment, in spite of the fact that the motor company was
not involved in the previous litigation nor was it in what is generally un-
derstood, privity with the defendant insurer. Moreover, identity of the
parties was lacking.
The most promising attack upon a sister-state judgment which is
sought to be enforced in another jurisdiction remains the one based on
lack of jurisdiction. In Maloney v. Hicks, 85 the court found that affidavits
raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the proper service of
process on the nonresident defendant under the Arkansas long-arm statute
since defendant allegedly refused to accept the respective mailings and
now denied any knowledge of the Arkansas suit altogether.
Cases involving the effect due to sister-state decisions dealing with
divorce, alimony, support and custody will be discussed later. 8 6
279. 273 U.S. 119 (1927).
280. 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
281. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
282. Huntington v. Attrill, [1893] A.C. 150. (P.C.).
283. The connotation of a penal statute in the "international" sense, used properly in
the English case, continues in interstate situations from Huntington and Loucks down to
Holbein.
284. 244 So.2d 742 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971); cf. Weissinger v. United States, 423 F.2d 795
(5th Cir. 1970), vacating 423 F.2d 782 (5th Cir. 1968).
285. 239 So.2d 620 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
286. See section V, D, infra; Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 318




The thrust of the Erie-Klaxon doctrine has been enunciated by federal
courts repeatedly and in a variety of formulations. When faced with the
application of state statutory or decisional law, federal courts follow the
interpretation supplied by state courts and, whenever possible, by an au-
thoritative pronouncement of the highest state court, in order to find the
"way the Erie wind blows." '287 In other instances, they search for the
"lampposts to light our Erie way."2 '
Difficulties arise where the highest court of the state has not spoken.
In such instances the federal court
may assume that state law will accord with generally accepted
principles of substantive law. . . .But in such a situation, a
federal diversity court nevertheless has an obligation to care-
fully examine the rules of construction and the substantive ap-
proach of the state court in analogous areas in an attempt to
derive 'instructive guidance' from the state tribunal.8 '
In fact, such efforts may amount to "an enlightened guess" 90 fraught
with difficulties which confront federal courts with the perplexing need to
prognosticate what a Florida judge would think a Pennsylvania
judge would think about a question that Pennsylvania judges
have not thought about.29'
In some instances, federal courts "follow published intermediate
state appellate court decisions unless [they] are convinced that the highest
state court would decide differently. '292 In others, federal courts take into
consideration the "decisions of other states, federal decisions or the gen-
eral weight of authority.
'291
287. Delduca v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 357 F.2d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1966).
See Fuchs v. Harbor Island Spa, Inc., 420 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1970). Unlike a denial of
certiorari by the United States Supreme Court, such a denial by the Supreme Court of Florida
is equivalent to an affirmation on the merits. Easthurn v. Ford Motor Co., 438 F.2d 125 (5th
Cir. 1971). See generally Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg., Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
288. Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 440 F.2d 36,
40 (10th Cir. 1971).
289. Glover v. Daniels, 310 F. Supp. 750, 753 (N.D. Miss. 1970), quoting Jackson v.
Sam Finley, Inc., 366 F.2d 148, 153 (5th Cir. 1966).
290. Glover v. Daniels, 310 F. Supp. 750, 753 (N.D. Miss. 1970), quoting Necaise v.
Chrysler Corp., 381 F.2d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 1967).
291. Beck v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 429 F.2d 813, 816 (5th Cir. 1970);
Klingbiel v. Commercial Credit Corp., 429 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1971), a "classical
situation where this Court must divine what a Kansas Court would think that a Missouri
Court was thinking about a question on which a Missouri Court had not yet thought."
292. Ruth v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 427 F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 1970).
293. Cottonwood Mall Shop, Inc. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 440 F.2d 365, 40 (10th
Cir. 1971), quoting 1 BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL P ACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 8, at 40
(Wright ed. 1961).
Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals restated its position in Tompkins v. City
of El Paso, 449 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1971) that in Erie cases a federal district court.
in making a vicarious determination of state law, [may] base its conclusion upon
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Does a mere expectation of a change in state law justify a federal
court in fulfilling such expectations and effectuate the change in their
determination of state law? A switch from the lex loci actus for contracts
to the law of significant relationship was foreseen in Singleton v. For-
man.29 4 But another such hunch went wrong in the Lester 95 litigation
forcing the court behind the wall of the false conflicts doctrine. Federal
courts, however, remain "Erie bound" by Florida precedents even though
Florida law on the particular point is a minority view. "[A] nomalous as
the Florida law may be, [the plaintiffs] are entitled to the benefit of it."29
By contrast, holdings of state trial courts are not considered binding
as precedents. However, the opinion may have the
persuasive force of having been entered in the very case and on
precisely the same issues, and it has the additional persuasiveness
of the fact that the state judge, in seeking to divine what was the
law of Florida, relied upon the opinion of the highest court of
Illinois.29
Another question is that of the effect of determinations of state law
made by federal courts, both on other federal courts and on state courts.
In regard to the first question, the federal court of appeals in the already
discussed Flying Saucers299 case, faced with the interpretation of a Florida
long-arm statute, section 48.181 of Florida Statutes (1969), felt bound
to look to the decisions of the Florida courts. However, where
our court has construed such a statute and no intervening state
court decision has placed a different construction on it, the rule
all relevant sources to which the state courts would themselves look .... This is
not to say that the federal courts cannot be innovative or impart new direction to
state law in diversity cases; rather the converse is true. It is, however, improper for
the federal courts to disregard the forum state's jurisprudence . . ., especially where
the jurisprudence does not evidence a trend toward the position taken by the district
court.
Id. at 844.
294. 435 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1970). On predicting future developments of state law, see
Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); Ideal Structures Corp. v.
Levine Huntsville Dev. Corp., 251 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ala. 1967), rev'd, 396 F.2d 917 (5th Cir.
1968). There, the court declined to accept the lower court's reasons for imminent change of
state law based on a recent trend in other states, increased doctrinal criticism, the espousal
of the foreseen rule by the RESTATEMENT ON CONFLICTS OF LAW (SECOND) §§ 332, 334, 599a
(1969), and the fact that the forum state (Alabama) had enacted the UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL
CODE containing the novel rule of significant relationship. The appellate court, however,
reasoned that "our Erie antenna is not so sensitive that we can gauge every variant breeze
of change" (Id. at 922), as inviting the "exhilarating opportunity of anticipating a doctrine
which may be in the womb of time, but whose birth is distant." Id., quoting Spector Motor
Serv. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823 (2d Cir. 1943) (Learned Hand, J., dissenting).
295. Lester v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 433 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1970).
296. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sampson, 305 F. Supp. 50, 53 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
297. King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153 (1948).
298. Hill v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 428 F.2d 112, 115 (5th Cir. 1970).
"[Als to the law of the United States, and particularly with respect to constitutional issues,
the Florida court's views are without binding effect." Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 319 F.2d
505, 509 (5th Cir. 1963).
299. 421 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1971).
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of stare decisis binds us to our earlier decision just as it does with
respect to any other matter with which the court has to deal.800
The same position prevailed in Entron, Inc. v. General Cablevision of
Palatka.°' However, the second question was not discussed recently.
In reviewing lower court's determination of state law, federal courts
of appeals give great weight to the views "taken by a district judge ex-
perienced in the law of the state, although of course the parties are en-
titled to review by us of the trial court's determination of state law just as
they are in any other legal question in a case.W
02
Cases of first impression involving the interpretation of state statutes
are particularly unwelcome to federal courts. In one such situation, a
federal court felt itself confronted with the "enfant terrible of the Erie
rule: a state statute, the duty of whose initial interpretation is delivered
into the unloving hands of the federal court." 3' This aspect of a case
decided recently by the United States Supreme Court304 was one of the
reasons the court ruled as it did.
In Erie situations, federal courts have dealt with various aspects of
Florida law. Among these aspects are: torts,' 05 contracts, 0 (particularly
insurance) ,3 the Uniform Commercial Code, 03 workmen's compensa-
300. Id. at 886-87. Cf. Brown v. City of Jacksonville, 236 So.2d 141 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
301. 435 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1970).
302. Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967), quoted in C.H.
Leavel & Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 424 F.2d 764, 766 (5th Cir. 1970).
303. Little v. Schafer, 319 F. Supp. 190 (S.D. Tex. 1970). Where the federal district
judge did not have a Florida appellate decision available rendered a few days before, he
granted a summary judgment, and the case was remanded. Edwards v. Imperial Cas. & Indem.
Co., 418 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1969).
304. Reetz v. Buzanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
305. Rawls v. Conde Nast Pub., Inc., 446 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Digregorio v. Indus-
trial Supply Corp., 438 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Box v. Southern Georgia Ry., 433 F.2d 89
(5th Cir. 1970); Diplomat Elec., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 430 F.2d 38 (5th Cir.
1970); Dvorak v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 429 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 19.70); Emerson Elec.
Co. v. Farmer, 427 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Pemberton v. Pan American World Airways,
423 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1970); Horne v. Georgia So. & Fla. R.R., 421 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1970) ;
Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Tennessee Corp., 321 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1970); Hertz Co. v.
Ralph M. Parsons Co., 419 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1969); Wm. G. Roe & Co. v. Armour & Co.,
414 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Honka v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 251 (S.D. Fla.
1971); Brooms v. James Lee Motor Co., 318 F. Supp. 867 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
306. Inter-Continental Promotions, Inc. v. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank, 441 F.2d 1356
(5th Cir. 1971) ; Northwest Accep. Corp. v. Heinicke Inst. Co., 441 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1971) ;
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 437 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1971);
Sanitary Linen Serv. Co. v. Alexander Proudfoot Co., 435 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1971); Pre-
cision Plating & Metal Finishing Inc. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 435 F.2d 1262 (5th Cir. 1970) ;
Lake v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 430 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Central Distrib., Inc. v.
M.E.T., Inc., 428 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1970); Mohasco Indus., Inc. v. Maxwell Co., 425 F.2d
436 (5th Cir. 1970); Craddock v. Greenhut Constr. Co., 423 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1970);
United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Banco Suizo-Panamento, S.A., 422 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1970);
General Dynamics Corp. v. Miami Aviation Corp., 421 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1970); Fuchs v.
Harbor Island Spa, Inc., 420 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Granik v. Perry, 418 F.2d 832 (5th
Cir. 1969); Aerojet-General Corp. v. Kirk, 318 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
307. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Carter, 446 F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Continental
Ins. Co. v. Sherman, 439 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1971); Moore v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
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tion,309 trusts,810 and the statute of limitations."
A few well established rules have found recent expression. The
determination of whether there is sufficient evidence to submit the case to
the jury is made according to federal standards. 12 Similarly, whenever
questions of state law arise on a motion for summary judgment which
raises the question of the materiality of particular facts, the question of
whether trial is necessary remains a matter to be decided by federal law.313
Co., 436 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Bishop v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 435 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.
1970) ; Cheek v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 432 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.
v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 430 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1970); Corporation of Americas, Ltd. v.
Export-Import Bank, 425 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Bush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 425 F.2d 393
(5th Cir. 1970); Rosen v. Godson, 422 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. United
Bonding Ins. Co., 422 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Yates v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 417
F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1969); Stefanski v. Mainway Budget Plan, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 138 (S.D.
Fla. 1971); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Usaform Hail Pool, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 1301 (M.D. Fla.
1970); Miami Nat'l Bank v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 314 F. Supp. 858 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
308. In re Fibre Glass Boat Corp., 324 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D. Fla. 1971); F.D.I.C. v.
Marine Nat'l Bank, 303 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
309. Trail Builders Supply Co. v. Reagan, 430 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1970).
310. Investors Syndicate of America, Inc. v. City of Indian Rocks Beach, 434 F.2d 871
(5th Cir. 1970) ; Celanese Coating Co. v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 421 F.2d 673 (5th Cir.
1970) (bailment).
311. Eastburn v. Ford Motor Co., 438 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Knowles v. Carson, 419
F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1969); Grissom v. North American Aviation, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 465 (M.D.
Fla. 1971).
312. Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969), followed in Telfair v. Zim
Israel Nay. Co., 428 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1970).
313. Lighting Fixture & Elec. Supply Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir.
1969). Outside of diversity cases, state law may fill gaps in federal law, particularly regarding
statutes of limitation. Mizell v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 427 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1970).
There is the qualification that
although the federal courts apply a state limitations statute in suits to vindicate a
federal right, they look to the federal purpose, policy and intent of Congress as to
the objectives of the legislation in determining whether the pursuit of state remedies
tolls this statute.
Id. at 474. The award of interest depends on state law. Peterson v. Klos, 433 F.2d 911 (5th
Cir. 1970).
The contention of the defendant in United States v. D'Amato, 436 F.2d 52 (5th Cir.
1970) that the question of state law involved in a conviction for traveling in interstate
commerce to promote violation of state law may only be challenged and interpreted in the
state courts, was rejected on the authority of Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943)
on the ground that the federal judiciary had never hesitated to
decide questions of state law when necessary for the disposition of a case . . .
although the highest court of the state ha[d] not answered them, the answers were
difficult, and the character of the answers which the highest state courts might
ultimately give remained uncertain ....
United States v. D'Amato, 436 F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir. 1970), quoting Meredith v. Winter Haven,
320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943), even though "it is the state court that speaks with final authority
on questions of state law." The court observed that its power to
decide state-law questions is not limited to cases brought under the Federal court's
diversity jurisdiction. In cases brought by virtue of their involvement with Federal
questions, the court is not limited to the Federal questions but will decide all of the
issues in the case including state-law questions.
Id. Federal law also controls the relationship between the lender, borrower, and the Small
Business Administration. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Boutin, 445 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir.
1971).
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B. Abstention and Certification
A federal court may, in certain "narrowly limited 'special circum-
stances,' "I"1 decline to entertain an action even though its jurisdiction is
properly invoked, in order to allow a state court to resolve the question of
state law involved in the federal litigation. There are three typical situa-
tions where this may happen. 3 The first involves cases where the con-
stitutionality of a state law under federal standards is questioned, and a
constitutional test may be avoided or materially altered by a prior de-
termination of state law in state courts. The second situation arises where
a federal court is called upon to intrude into an area of paramount state
interest in the operation of the state's own administration. Third, the
type of interest for this study, arises in diversity litigation "where the
abstention has been countenanced when unclear or unusually difficult
questions of state law are presented." ' 6
The doctrine of abstention has been developed through a long line of
cases, among them those handed down in 1959,s ' when the doctrine
reached its broadest application. Subsequent cases have substantially
limited its scope. Recently, the United States Supreme Court has ruled on
situations involving constitutional aspects. Nevertheless, the radiation of
these decisions may reach into mere choice-of-law situations. In Reetz v.
Bozanick, 18 the court was faced with the constitutionality of an Alaska
statute under the Alaska and federal constitutions. The court repeated the
principle that abstention is "not necessary whenever a federal court is
faced with a question of local law,"3"9 since abstention "certainly involves
duplication of effort and expense and an attendant delay. '3 20 Consequently,
abstention should be applied only where the "issue of state law is uncer-
tain."' In the present case a determination by a state court of the con-
stitutionality of the statute under the state constitution could "conceivably
avoid any decision under the Fourteenth Amendment and would avoid any
possible irritant in the federal-state relationship, 22 particularly since
"here the nub of the whole controversy may be the state constitution." 23
314. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967); Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (8th
Cir. 1970) ; see Survey IV at 472.
315. Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 437 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Press v. Pasadena Ind. School
Dist., 326 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D.
Cal. 1971); Bednar, Abstention under Delaney: a Current Appraisal, 49 TEx. L. REv. 247
(1971); Keilin, Abstention from Jurisdiction: Accommodation or Abdication?, 23 ARK. L.
REv. 412 (1969).
316. Press v. Pasadena Ind. School Dist., 326 F. Supp. 550, 553 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
317. Kurland, Toward A Cooperative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention
Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481 (1960).
318. 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
319. Id. at 86.
320. Id.
321. Id., quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1964).
322. Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970).
323. Id.
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Finally, the "first judicial application of these constitutional provisions
should properly be by an Alaska court," when parties "repaired to the
state courts for a resolution of their state constitutional question." 2'
In a similar situation involving a "rather vague Puerto Rican law
that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has not yet authoritatively con-
strued," the same result was reached.825
However, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,8 26 a widely split court has
rejected abstention on the ground that the Wisconsin statute is not uncer-
tain. In another case involving Florida's loyalty oath, the dissenting
justice urged unsuccessfully that "Florida courts should . . . be given an
opportunity to construe the clause before the federal courts pass on its
constitutionality.
8 27
Turning now to Florida related federal cases, the construction of a
family automobile liability insurance policy was at issue in Boyd v. Bow-
man.82 The court, "confronted with a perplexing question of State law that
resists satisfactory resolution by this Court alone," and finding that "exist-
ing State decisions cast little Erie light," expressed its belief that it is
"blessed with no greater prescience after absorbing Erie-Florida law than
before, and following oft-established Dractice of declining to accept our
own judicial hypotheses when State decisional certainty is within legiti-
mate reach, ''82 decided on certification. The court was aware of the alter-
native to "pre-guess the Florida courts and dispose of this controversy
immediately . . . by trying to divine what the State law will be though the
markers are nonexistent or indistinct." 80 This procedure, the court con-
tinues, will prevent federal courts from reaching "a decision now which
turns out a moment later to be wrong."133 1 It also will avoid
the uncertainty of the principles presented primarily involv [ing]
state policy choices in the process of interpretation on our part,
and when alternatives such as certification are available, we need
not to be content with Erie shots in the dark at the shifting and
oft-times illusory target of State law as a basis for disposing of
the controversy here and now."32
Similarly certified was the question of liability of a supervising
architect for damages to the general contractor in Moyer v. Graham.33
324. Id.
325. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970).
326. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
327. Connell v. Higgenbotham, 91 S. Ct. 1772, 1774 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
328. 443 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1971).
329. Id. at 849.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 850.
332. Id.
333. 443 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Allen v. Estate of Carman, 446 F.2d 1276
(5th Cir. 1971) ; National Education Ass'n v. Lee County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 448 F.2d
451 (5th Cir. 1971) and Oliva v. Touchton, 448 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1971) where the court




The dissolution of the simple lex loci delict 84 has brought about a
variety of complex decisional adjustments which are currently far from
having jelled in a workable tool. The strongest counter-attack against the
innovators came from the Louisiana Supreme Court in Johnson v. St. Paul
Mercury Insurance Co.8"5 A guest passenger riding in a car owned by
another Louisianan, garaged in Louisiana, and insured under a Louisiana
contract, was injured on a trip to Iowa. The injury occurred in Arkansas
which has the usual guest statute requiring willful negligence while
Louisiana has no guest statute at all, and ordinary negligence would war-
rant recovery. The Louisiana Supreme Court first stressed the difference
between stare decisis and jurisprudence constante obtaining in Louisiana
and found that no line of decisions warrants a deviation from the lex loci
delicti rule adhered to consistently by Louisiana courts. Of course, de-
fendant urged that Louisiana should abandon its lex loci rule in favor of
the grouping of contacts and the resulting center of gravity rules as the
New York court did in Babcock v. Jackson.86 The court found this rule
anything but clear in its combination with the doctrine of proper law,
governmental interest, the most significant relationship and the place of
the garaging of the vehicle. This, and other factors, caused the Louisiana
court to "pause and hesitate to embrace this somewhat fashionable but
free-wheeling tendency."" 7 In the opinion of the court, the cause of action
must be given by some law, and it "can be given only by the law of the
place where the tort is committed." ' If this were not the case, the court
would apply its tort law extraterritorially. There is also the selection by
the plaintiff of the forum "with ... attendant built-in inclination to favor
Supreme Court from "relying upon, articulating or expressing its reasons in terms of consti-
tutional principles (state or Federal) in arriving at decisions on the State question." Id. at
439.
334. For an up-to-date survey, see R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1971); Kahn-Freund, Delictual Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 124 RECUEIL DES
CoURs DE L'ACADEME DE DROIT INT'L 5 (1968); Ehrenzweig, Specific Principles of Private
Transnational Law, 124 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEME DE DROIT INT'L 179 (1968); Wein-
traub, The Emerging Problems in Judicial Administration of State-Interest Analysis of Tort
Conflict of Laws Problem, 44 So. CAL. L. REV. 877 (1971).
335. 256 La. 289, 236 So.2d 216 (1970), rev'g 218 So.2d 375 (La. App. 1969); Couch,
Choice of Law, Guest Statutes and the Louisiana Supreme Court: Six Judges in Search of a
Rule Book, 45 TuL. L. Rxv. 100 (1970). Cf. Orestiadou v. Succession of Andrews, 236 So.2d
884 (La. App. 1970) ; Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).
336. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), first adopted by the
Florida Supreme Court acting on a certified question in Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,
201 So.2d 743 (Fla. 1967), but immediately rejected on rehearing by Hopkins v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., 201 So.2d 743 (Fla. 1967) ; see Survey III at 544.
337. Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 256 La. 289, 305, 236 So.2d 216, 222 (1970).
338. Id. at 306, 236 So.2d at 222. The court describes the Babcock doctrine as
vague and ill defined at best leading to confusion, and at worst manifestly dangerous
because it opens wide the door to decisions based on whim or caprice, with after-
the-fact fabrication of contact analysis offered for additional weight and justification.
Id. at 304, 236 So.2d at 221.
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the plaintiff,"8 9 particularly since the adoption of the contact doctrines
will "warrant an excursion into a nebulous field where in complex situa-
tions each decision will call for an unstable exercise in legal gymnastics." '
Such far-reaching law reform through courts was considered improper lest
courts "devise new and untried rules to circumvent ... legislative enact-
ments." On the contrary, the lex loci delicti rule has certainty, simplicity,
ease of application, and also complies with the full faith and credit precept.
This rule also encourages comity which is "so important to a workable
federalism, '8 4' and imposes restraint upon states in the extraterritorial
application of their laws. In disposing of the issue, the court indicated a
threefold process to be followed in such situations: first, it must "perceive
the relevant social policies involved in the change; 3 4 2 second, it must
develop a rule to replace the rule to be abandoned; and third, the rule
so formulated must be workable. Limiting this scheme to the last aspect,
the court found that the new doctrines were "in their formative stages, and
will not lend themselves to a sound declaration of new law,'8 4 particularly
since the main thrust is not directed toward establishing a rule of general
application, but "to do justice in the individual case." '44
Only two decisions dealing with torts may be noted. In Kuklis v.
Hancock, 45 the court approved the judgment for a plaintiff which granted
damages arising out of a car collision in Germany. Difficulties involved in
the case had been eliminated by a stipulation between parties to have
Florida tort law control all aspects of the case. Particular problems, such
as admission of the accident report, defendant's blood-alcohol test, 4 6 and
the applicability of the federal shop-book statute847 were decided without
reference to the lex loci delicti. In Morison v. General Motors Corp.,48
the release of "all other persons, firms, and corporations liable or who may
be claimed to be liable" contained a settlement between the insurer of the
driver and the owner of the car on the one hand, and the passenger, on the
other, and also benefited the manufacturer of the car. Both parties had
consented to the application of the lex loci delicti, i.e., Arkansas, and
Arkansas law was applied by the court.
Recent difficulties in handling guest statutes according to the Bab-
cock 49 rule have appeared not only in Louisiana in Johnson, but also in
New York. In Pryor v. Swarner,"8 ° the federal court with jurisdiction
339. Id. at 306, 236 So.2d at 222.
340. Id. at 307, 236 So.2d at 222.
341. Id. at 308, 236 So.2d at 223.
342. Id. at 309, 236 So.2d at 223.
343. Id. at 310, 236 So.2d at 223.
344. Id. Cf. McDaniel v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., Case No. 71-1057 (5th Cir. filed
January 24, 1972).
345. 428 F.2d 608 (Sth Cir. 1970).
346. FLA. STAT. § 317.171 (1969).
347. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970).
348. 428 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1970).
349. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
350. 445 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1971).
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based on diversity held that the New York guest statute is inapplicable to
an Ohio accident involving a New Yorker as a guest passenger in an auto-
mobile registered and insured in Florida, in view of the fact that both Ohio
and Florida bar recovery for simple negligence.
B. Contracts
In Florida the traditional choice-of-law rule regarding contracts-
absent parties' choice of law-still seems to prevail. The traditional rule
combines-according to the two phases of the contractual process-the
law of the place of making with the law of the place of performance.
Recently, the rule was restated in State-Wide Insurance Co. v. Flaks,851
where the court noted that
matters bearing on the execution, validity, interpretation and
obligations of contracts are determined by the law of the place
where the contract is made, although matters connected with
performance are regulated by the law of the place where the con-
tract by its terms may have been provided to be performed and
matters relating to the procedure, .. . [by] the law of the
forum. 52
The new relativist approach using the "grouping of contacts" did not
remain unnoticed in Florida. This approach was tentatively mentioned in
Rutas Aereas Nacionales, S.A. v. Robinson,"" and, in addition to the
choice of law by parties agreement, later became the fundamental rule for
transactions within the scope of the Uniform Commercial Code,854 under
the formula of "appropriate relation to this state."' 55 It may be expected
that the new method will percolate into areas outside of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code856 and gradually influence conflict rules applicable to con-
tracts generally.
Without waiting for any of these possibilities to materialize, a fed-
eral court sitting in diversity took a step in this direction. In Singleton
351. 233 So.2d 400 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
352. Id. at 402. The language stems from justice Storey's opinion in Bank of the United
States v. Donnally, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 361, 371 (1834) that, as a general principle adopted by
civilized nations, the "nature, validity and interpretation of contracts are to be governed by
the law of the country where the contracts are made, or are to be performed." This doctrine
was adopted subsequently in Perry v. Lewis, 6 Fla. 555 (1856) and Crowell v. Skipper, 6
Fla. 580 (1856) ; followed in Brown v. Case, 80 Fla. 703, 86 So. 684 (1920). Cf. Connor v.
Elliott, 79 Fla. 513, 85 So. 164 (1920) ; Warner v. Florida Bank & Trust Co., 160 F.2d 766
(5th Cir. 1947).
353. 339 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1964). See Survey II at 528.
354. Survey II at 498.
355. FLA. STAT. § 671.105 (1969).
356. Such expansion is even recommended in Morange v. States Marines Lines, Inc., 398
U.S. 375, 392 (1970):
It has always been the duty of the common law court to perceive the impact of
major legislative innovations and to interweave the new legislative policies with the
inherited body of common law principles-many of them deriving from earlier
legislative exertions.
Cf. United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971).
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v. Foreman,57 an action brought by a client against her attorney, the
court started from the traditional rule of the lex loci actus and proceeded
to later cases that indicate a "more flexible position." The sub-
sequent cases look to both traditional contract contacts, i.e., the place of
making and the place of performance interchangeably, connecting them
with "or." In its attempt to find cases dealing with situations where the
place of making and performances were different, the court remained
unsuccessful and resorted to the assumption that if a Florida court would
have to choose between these two contacts, it would decide in favor of
the one with "more significant relationship to that contract.""' 8 Following
this line of reasoning, the court found that "Florida, the place of per-
formance, has the more significant relationship to the contract," while
the Tennessee contacts, arising "solely from the transitory presence of
the parties, were insignificant and entirely fortuitous." 5 ' The attorney's
contract to represent the plaintiff in her divorce suit to have been filed in
Florida was "performable in Florida since the contract dealt with a
divorce and property settlement to be obtained in Florida." The contract
was also found to touch upon matters in the nature of "sensitive domestic
relations ... peculiarly within Florida's domain."86
In an action for breach of contract, apparently made in New York and
to be performed in Florida, the court in the previously discussed Merlite...
case observed that in matters of contracts the "Erie light is now refracted
by many prisms of competing theories." '862 Nevertheless, the court felt
"bound to determine which law the Florida courts would apply,"86 ' and
found that Florida courts would apply the law of the place of making. The
conflict, however, was moot "since under any of the possible theories only
the law of Florida or New York could be applied," and there was "ap-
parently no disparity on the substantive principles concerning this
case."
64
A number of recently decided cases deal with sales. In Economic Re-
search Analysts, Inc. v. Brennan,865 the alleged breach on the part of de-
fendant of his promise given to the plaintiff California corporation not to
enter into employment with another dealer in securities in the South
Florida area was disposed of under Florida Statutes section 542.12 (1969).
Claims arising from the sale in Florida of an aircraft in custody of seller's
bailee in Luxembourg, including the rescission of the contract, were de-
cided according to Florida law, without referring to the choice-of-law
357. 435 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1970).
358. Id. at 969.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Merlite Land, Sea & Sky, Inc. v. Palm Beach Inv. Properties, Inc., 426 F.2d 495
(5th Cir. 1970).
362. Id. at 497 n.2.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. 232 So.2d 219 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
CONFLICT OF LAWS
problems involved, in Pinellas Central Bank & Trust Co. v. International
Aerodyne, Inc. 6 An extensive discussion of choice-of-law questions also
was avoided in Holcomb v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,367 involving the purchase
of an airplane in Kansas to be ferried to Louisiana and later flown to
Florida. When defects were subsequently discovered, the buyer claimed
damages. The trial court applied Kansas law on the authority of Sperry
Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp.,80 and the parties agreed with this
solution. In consequence the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted in
Kansas in 1966, was applied.
Among insurance cases, the already mentioned State-Wide Insurance
Co. v. Flaks'69 dealt with the question of what law determines the interest
due on the insurance sum. The court was faced with the dilemma that
Florida allows interest on the sum due on the judgment while New York
adheres to the rule that interest is due on the amount payable according
to the policy. The court decided, relying on the conflict rule that the inter-
pretation and obligations of contracts are determined by the laws of the
place where the contracts are made, ' 370 in favor of New York law. A
family combination policy issued to plaintiff's father in Pennsylvania
while the plaintiff was stationed in Florida and as such a resident of
Florida was interpreted according to the law of Pennsylvania which would
be applied by Florida courts . 71 However, Pennsylvania has not yet de-
cided whether a serviceman changes his residence by being stationed away
from home. Consequently, the federal court had to "prognosticate" and
found that Pennsylvania courts would hold that the serviceman was still a
resident of his father's household, mainly on the ground that Pennsyl-
vania would follow the majority rule. The law of the place of making also
prevailed in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Employers' Liability Assurance
Corp.,872 and the Illinois rule adopting the majority position in favor of
the excess clause won over the minority position giving effect to an escape
clause.
It may be added that the decision in Confederation Life Insurance
Co. v. Campaneria8 73 was affirmed on the authority of Confederation Life
Association v. Vega Arminan 74 and Imperial Life Assurance Corp. v.
Colmenares.3 75 In the latter case, the Supreme Court of Canada held that
place of making of a contract is not decisive as the proper law but the
problem of determining the proper law to be "solved by considering the
366. 233 So.2d 872 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
367. 439 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1971).
368. 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Survey II at 528.
369. 233 So.2d 400 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
370. Id. at 402.
371. Id.
372. 316 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D. Fla. 1970). Cf. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201
So.2d 743, 751 '(Fla. 1967).
373. 247 So.2d 496 (Fla. 1971).
374. 207 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1968); see Survey IV at 480.
375. [1967] Can. Law Rep. 443, 62 Doam. L. Rep. 2d 138 (1967).
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contract as a whole in light of all the circumstance which surround it and
applying the law with which it appears to have the closest and most sub-
stantial connection.M
7 6
A question of usury was litigated in Southern Farm Bureau Life In-
surance Co. v. McClellan17 involving an additional collateral note for an
old indebtedness. The note provided for six and one-half percent interest
which was considered as usurious under the controlling law of New York.
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the additional note
was not a new and separate obligation and affirmed the judgment for
plaintiff.
Two cases involving international choice-of-law situations also have
been decided. In Corporation of Americas, Ltd. v. Export-Import Bank,187
the insured seller of aircraft engines and spare parts brought an action on
a policy issued in connection with the shipment of goods to a Chilean
airline. However, the foreign buyer failed to submit the necessary docu-
ments to obtain an import license which, in turn, would allow the conver-
sion of foreign currency into dollars. In consequence, the insurer was held
not liable on a policy covering transfer risk because of the failure of the
Chilean government to appropriate the necessary exchange. Consequently,
the plaintiff was precluded from recovery under the transfer risks of the
policy. The other case is Bethell v. Peace.79 In addition to the jurisdic-
tional issue already discussed,"' the court discussed the choice-of-law
question and stressed that it presents a different problem. In general terms
the court pointed out that "[w]hen dealing with contracts to sell land,
rather than actual conveyances, courts have sometimes applied the sub-
stantive law that would be applied under the conflicts rule dealing with
contracts in general," and indicated that Florida courts "might apply
Florida law here because of its strong interest in the parties and the con-
tract."8
8 1
A few decisions dealt with workmen's compensation. In Wainwright
376. Id. at 448, 62 Dom. L. Rep. 2d at 142. Among Cuban insurance cases, note Johansen
v. Confederation Life Ass'n, 312 F. Supp. 1056 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Gonzales y Camejo v.
Sun Life Assur. Co., 313 F. Supp. 1011 (D.P.R. 1970).
Recently, two additional cases dealing with Cuban insurance contracts have been decided.
In Oliva v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 448 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1971), the court held that
rights under an insurance policy of a former Cuban resident were not expropriated by Cuban
confiscation decrees, nor did the act of state doctrine preclude liability on the part of the
insurer; but the proviso of the policy converted in 1952 to be payable on the basis of one
peso for one dollar (at this time equivalent), was modified in regard to the cash surrender
so as to be computed at the exchange rate prevailing when the demand was made. In Con-
federation Life Assoc. v. Conte, 254 So.2d 45 *(Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), the insured was held to be
under no duty to return to Cuba to receive payment in Cuban pesos; instead, he was en-
titled to the mature value of the policy in dollars (equivalent to the proper conversion rate
from pesos). Cf. Johansen v. Confederation Life Ass'n, 447 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1971).
377. 422 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1970).
378. 425 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1970) ; cf., Keystone Acceptance Corp. v. Dynalectron Corp.,
445 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
379. 441 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1971).
380. Section II supra.
381. Bethell v. Peace, 441 F.2d 495, 497 (5th Cir. 1971).
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v. Wainwright, Inc.,882 the Supreme Court of Florida held that the Florida
Workmen's Compensation sLaw cannot be statutorily expanded to other
states to cover employments in which Florida has neither interest nor
authority, in spite of an agreement to this effect. In Hanover Insurance
Co. v. Florida Industrial Comm., 8 /the court found coverage under the
Florida statute since the employee was hired to work partially in the
Bahamas, but not exclusively. Finally, in de Cancino v. Eastern Air
Lines,8 84 the court held that the employee may seek recovery in another
state, but may not recover in Florida additional benefits which would bring
recovery beyond what was due to him under the Florida statute.
C. Property
1. REAL PROPERTY
The litigation between the United States and a group of developers
planning to construct a new sovereign nation on reefs off the Florida coast
resulted in a permanent injunction against interference by the developers
with the rights of the United States in the coral reefs. The injunction was
granted by the trial court 385 on one of the two grounds urged by the gov-
ernment, namely that the activities of the developers have been unlawfully
conducted without the required authorization from the Secretary of the
Army while the second ground, a trespass on an area over which the
United States has control, was rejected. The court of appeals886 affirmed
the decision on the ground relied upon by the trial court, but reversed it in
regard to trespass. The court below took the position that the interests of
the United States in the area are "something less than a property right,
consisting of neither ownership nor possession, and consequently not sup-
porting law action for trespass quare clausum fregit. s7 Instead, the ap-
pellate court found sovereign and exclusive rights of the United States in
the disputed area under federal as well as international law, namely the
Convention on the Continental Shelf (Geneva, 1958),888 which "para-
mount rights" also support, regardless of ownership or possession, the
injunctive relief granted. 89
2. PERSONAL PROPERTY
Two cases dealing with Florida law applied in other jurisdictions
may be noted. In Insurance Company of North America v. Alexander,8 90
382. 237 So.2d 154 (Fla. 1970).
383. 234 So.2d 661 (Fla. 1970).
384. 239 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1970).
385. United States v. Ray, 294 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Fla. 1969) see Survey IV at 484.
386. United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970).
387. Id. at 19.
388. [1964] 2 U.S.T. 473, T.I.A.S. No. 5578.
389. See Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970) (dredging and filling of navigable
waters); Continental Oil Co. v. London Steam-Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 417 F.2d 1303
(5th Cir. 1969) (outer continental shelf).
390. 321 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
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the endorsement of a Florida certificate of title to a car was involved. In
Seely v. First Bank & Trust,"9' a New York court held that the plaintiff
buyer of a truck not sold in the ordinary course of business and without
the buyer's knowledge of the Florida source of the title has priority for
his purchase interest over the defendant bank which held a mortgage on
the truck and permitted the seller, who had acquired title in Florida, to
register title in New York. The seller did not use the proceeds to pay the
bank lien.
Two minor changes in statutory law brought about by the 1970
legislative session may be mentioned. One affects Florida Statutes section
65.031 (1969), dealing with the enforcement of liens on the owner or
operator of a garage or storage place which attach to cars deposited there
by a law enforcement agency. The period which must elapse before the
lien may be enforced without judicial proceedings was reduced from 75 to
45 days. This procedure also may affect foreign registered cars thereby
creating conflict problems. The second change affects the escheat of funds
in possession of federal agencies. 92
D. Family Law
The 1971 Florida legislature enacted a significant reform of the
traditional divorce law. 8 It eliminated enumerated divorce grounds and
substituted the criteria of an irretrievable break and mental incompet-
ence."94 Some of the newly enacted provisions affect conflict aspects and
will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
1. JURISDICTION TO DISSOLVE MARRIAGE
The new enactment did not change controlling jurisdictional rules. It
even retained the misleading provision that such proceedings "may be
brought against persons residing out of state." '895 The six months residence
requirements 6 also remained unchanged.
The existence of a domicile in Florida on the part of the wife suing
for divorce from the husband residing in England was at issue in Ashmore
v. Askmore.89 7 In principle, the appellate court held that the alleged in-
tention of the wife to go to England did not amount to such a "change in
domicile as defeats the jurisdiction of Florida courts," particularly since
there is "no evidence that she acted on that intention, and the intent alone
391. 64 Misc. 2d 845, 315 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
392. FLA. STAT. § 716.02(5) (Supp. 1970).
393. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 61.011, 61.021, 61.031, 61.061,
61.071, 61.08, 61.09, 61.10, 61.11, 61.12, 61.13, 61.14, 61.16, 61.17, 61.18, 61.19 (1969) ; adding
FLA. STAT. §§ 61.043, 61.044, 61.052; repealing FLA. STAT. §§ 61.041, 61.042, 61.051, 61.15
(1969).
394. FLA. STAT. § 61.052.
395. Fla, Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.061 (1969).
396. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.021 (1969).
397. 241 So.2d 424 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
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does not suffice." 89 8 Nevertheless, the court left open a door by asking the
question whether upon her marriage to an Englishman in England she
"lost her Florida domicile by operation of law and became a domiciliary
of England in spite of her retention of her home here." '899
The sufficiency of notice to the husband was litigated in Roxby v.
Roxby °00 On appeal, constructive service of process at defendant's last
known residence outside of Florida was held sufficient to give the court
jurisdiction to reverse a judgment setting aside the divorce decree ob-
tained by the wife, even though she "may have lacked candor and good
faith in not sending an additional notice" '' regarding husband's known
mailing address.
The jurisdiction of federal courts in matters of divorce was again at
issue in Lutsky v. Lutsky. °2 The wife, divorced in Alabama, sought a
declaratory judgment that the divorce was null and void. The federal
district court maintained the traditional position of the federal courts and
"disclaim [ed] any jurisdiction... upon the subject of divorce."4 Never-
theless, the court admitted that this does not "necessarily mean that [the
federal courts] lack jurisdiction to determine the validity of a divorce
decree rendered by a foreign [sic] court, provided there is some jurisdic-
tional basis, such as diversity."40 4 This may be true in cases where the
question of divorce is incidental to a matter which otherwise is within the
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. However, a federal
court must not "ignore the effect of prior litigation upon the rights of the
parties to now contest their marital status in this court."40 5 In any case,
final decisions of state courts are within the scope of res judicata and
the full faith and credit clause. These concepts are also operative between
federal and state courts except in rare cases where state judgments are
vulnerable on constitutional grounds amounting to constitutional de-
ficiencies. In the present case, the court held that the plaintiff was not "en-
titled to two declarations of the same right," nor did the declaratory
judgment procedure "furnish a new forum to re-litigate issues previously
decided."406
2. GROUNDS FOR DISSOLUTION
By eliminating the previously enumerated divorce grounds, the 1971
divorce reform act sounded a well deserved death knell to the oft-
398. Id. at 425.
399. Id.
400. 235 So.2d 58 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
401. Id. at 59.
402. 310 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Fla. 1970). See also Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797
(E.D.N.Y. 1968).
403. Lutsky v. Lutsky, 310 F. Supp. 517, 518 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
404. Id. at 519.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 520.
1971)
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVI
litigated Ground Eight which required that defendant has "obtained a
divorce from plaintiff in any other state or country."4 7
3. FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREES
Final divorce decrees are entitled-on the interstate as well as state-
federal level-to full faith and credit. The first part of the principle was
recently restated by the Supreme Court of Florida in Newton v. New-
ton:4
08
It is well-established law that every state is required to recognize
and respect the valid final decrees and orders of the courts of all
other states. A decree or order valid in the state where it is issued
ordinarily will be honored in any state where an attempt is made
to bring suit on the same cause of action. A divorce decree of any
state is presumed valid on its face and until same is proved to
be invalid serves as a bar to successful prosecution of another
action for divorce in this state. The trial court is not at liberty to
ignore the binding order of the foreign court.4 09
Foreign divorce mills have recently moved from one jurisdiction to
two others; 410 however, legal problems they cause in this country remain
the same.
4. ALIMONY
In Newton v. Newton,4 ' the affirmance by the appellate court of a
decree in a wife's divorce action granting temporary alimony and counsel's
fees, was quashed on the ground that defendant's contention that he had
been divorced in Nevada by a final decree, valid on its face, was bypassed
by the trial court. On the authority of Steward v. Steward, 12 the court held
that the trial court could not order payment of alimony or counsel's fees
until it had determined whether the Nevada divorce involved in that case
was valid. The dissent opposed the ruling on three grounds: first, that
plaintiff did not challenge the Nevada decree, but used it as the basis for
asserting Ground Eight; that such action qualifies her for alimony pur-
suant to the rationale of Pawley v. Pawley;413 and finally, that Florida
407. FLA. STAT. § 61.041(8) (1969) ; see Survey I at 311.
408. 245 So.2d 45 (Fla. 1971).
409. Id. at 46.
410. In 1971, Mexico enacted an amendment to its Nationality and Naturalization Law
of 1934, severely restricting jurisdiction involving divorces by aliens. [1971] D.O. See
Bayitch, Inter-American Legal Developments, 3 LAW. AM. 274, 299 (1971). Divorces granted
in Haiti and the Dominican Republic have replaced the now defunct Mexican "quickie"
divorce; see Bayitch, Inter-American Legal Developments, 3 LAW. Am. 507, 535, 542 (1971).
The statement in W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS
862 (1971), regarding the new Mexican enactment, is erroneous. On recognition of Mexican
divorces, see S. BAYITCH & M. SIQUEIROS, CONFLICT OF LAWS: MEXICO AND THE UNITED
STATES: A BILATERAL STUDY 241 (1968).
411. 245 So.2d 45 (Fla. 1971).
412. 115 Fla. 158, 155 So. 114 (1934).
413. 46 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1950).
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courts have the power to modify foreign alimony decrees, in this case the
decree rendered in Nevada granting plaintiff 75 dollars per month.
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law414 was used
by a wife to require the husband to pay arrearages due under an out-of-
state support order. The husband's counterclaim for divorce was dismissed
by the appellate court on the ground that the import of the statute is to
"confer jurisdiction on the circuit court solely for the purpose of enforcing
a reciprocal support order.1
415
It may be added that Florida Statutes section 61.10 consolidated
petitions of either spouse, but underwent no changes affecting conflict
aspects. The requirement that the petitioning spouse reside in this state
apart from the other spouse and minor children "whether or not such
separation is through his fault," remains unchanged.
The interplay between two divorce actions, one in Alabama and the
other in Florida, was considered in Billingsley v. Billingsley."6 The wife
filed her divorce suit in Alabama on July 9, 1966, while her husband filed
his suit on July 26, 1966 in Florida. The wife's attorney plead in abate-
ment in the Florida action, but was not heard since he was not authorized
to practice in the state. The Florida court entered a divorce decree on
September 19, 1966. The Alabama proceedings resulted, without the
husband's participation, in a divorce decree in September 29, 1966, also
vesting the title to land in Alabama, previously held under tenure in com-
mon, exclusively in the wife as lump sum alimony. The husband filed a
bill of review which brought the case before the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama. There can be no doubt that the marriage had been dissolved even
though service in Alabama was constructive. Both courts had jurisdiction
and reached an identical result:
It is perfectly clear under the developed doctrines that a court
may have full power to grant a divorce to a person domiciled
therein even though the service on the other party be construc-
tive. This for the reason that a sufficient part of the marriage
res accompanies the domiciliary complainant, and authorizes an
in rem action to determine the status of such res.
417
A more difficult question was that regarding land granted as alimony. The
Alabama Supreme Court stated its position as follows: "Alimony, how-
ever, is a personal action and a court cannot properly award a personal
judgment for alimony unless personal jurisdiction be acquired of the
respondent, or, as here, property be within the jurisdiction of the granting
state. 4 18 The court concluded that since the land was situated in Ala-
bama, it was within the power of Alabama courts to issue a decree "af-
414. FLA. STAT. §§ 88.011-.371 (1969).
415. Simpson v. Simpson, 247 So.2d 792, 793 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
416. 285 Ala. 239, 231 So.2d 111 (1970).
417. Id. at 241, 231 So.2d at 113.
418. Id. at 242, 231 So.2d at 113.
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fecting the res or status of the Alabama land. .. ,"' In response to the
husband's contention that alimony can be awarded only in divorce pro-
ceedings which presuppose an existing marriage (which did not exist after
Florida's earlier divorce decree), the court first emphasized that the
divorce court in its position of a court of equity had the "power to de-
termine the interrelated equities of the interest and of the parties to the
land"42 in Alabama. Admitting that permanent alimony may only be
granted in divorce proceedings, and that such proceedings are dependent
upon the existence of a marital relation at the time the action is instituted
(the action in Alabama was instituted prior to the one in Florida), the
court held that once a court of equity "acquires jurisdiction of a cause for
any purpose, it will retain it and do complete justice between the parties,
enforcing, if necessary, legal rights and applying legal remedies to ac-
complish that end, and that jurisdiction is not ousted because it does not
have power to do all the things requested." 42' The court concluded that
Alabama's jurisdiction over the subject matter (land) "continued not-
withstanding the Florida decree except insofar as recognition of the mari-
tal capacity of the parties is necessitated by the Full Faith and Credit
provision of the Federal Constitution . ,,4"" The Alabama decree in no
way interfered with the Florida decree regarding its marital status chang-
ing effects. It may be added that a divorced wife is not prevented, at least
on constitutional grounds, from pressing her claim for alimony provided
the respective jurisdiction provides for such a remedy.2 8
5. CUSTODY
The question of jurisdiction in matters of custody was discussed in
Keena v. Keena 4 Contrary to the ruling of the trial court holding that it
has no jurisdiction regarding custody because the wife had removed the
children-during the divorce action-to Germany, the appellate court
held that "once a court acquires jurisdiction, it has continuing jurisdiction
which cannot be divested when one of the parties flees the geographical
area." 2 Quoting from Rhoades v. Bohn,426 the court encountered a
qualification on the rule, namely that once a court acquires jurisdiction of
a minor as an ancillary matter in a divorce proceeding and enters an order
or decree touching custody, the court has continuing jurisdiction. This
qualification, however, was held to be a "distinction without a differ-
ence" 427 here, since the important and overriding factor was that the trial
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 242, 231 So. 2d at 114.
422. Id.
423. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
424. 245 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
425. Id. at 666.
426. 114 So.2d 493, 498 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959).
427. Keena v. Keena, 245 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1971).
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judge has "acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant-wife
and the minor children by reason of their physical presence in the geo-
graphical area of the court's jurisdiction .... 428 Additionally, both parties
had actively participated in the proceedings which "vested jurisdiction of
the subject matter in the trial court." '429
The question of continuing jurisdiction again came up in Haley v.
Edwards.4 30 There the court ruled that continuing jurisdiction of a divorce
court in matters of custody is exclusive, at least on an inter-county basis.
However, where the original custody decree was rendered in a sister state,
such continuing and exclusive jurisdiction does not apply "[s]ince there
should always be a court to protect an infant's interest in the state where
he is located.
' 431
The perennial question of whether custody decrees partake of the
benefits of the full faith and credit clause was answered in Powell v.
Powell4" 2 in that "Florida . . . judgments affecting the custody of minors
are not entitled to recognition under the full faith and credit clause be-
cause they do not possess the requisite degree of finality. . . .,4 This
position is open to doubt since any judicial act qualified by its origin,
jurisdiction, and procedure retains, as long as it stands unchallenged and
not modified by another court of proper jurisdiction, the authority of res
judicata which is guaranteed by the full faith and credit clause. Instead,
Florida courts-and courts of other jurisdictions-recognize only that
sister state custody decrees are "entitled to great weight and respect under
the doctrine of comity, absent a showing by clear and convincing evidence
that such new conditions have arisen since rendition of the decree as
would justify a change of custody. '484 In any case, such ruling may apply
only for the future by reason of the fact that a retroactive change of
custody would simply make no sense regardless of the generally admitted
prima facie validity of sister state judicial decisions. Nevertheless, accord-
ing to the holding in the case discussed here, the "[a]pplication of the
doctrine of comity is a matter of discretion ... and depends for its con-
sideration upon the foreign court having had jurisdiction and having
properly litigated the matter before it.1415 In the present case, the Louisi-
ana court which ruled on the custody was found to have had jurisdiction
based on domicile and had properly litigated the issue. For this reason,
the Florida trial court's ruling in accordance with the Louisiana decree
was affirmed on appeal since no appreciable change in the circumstances
has been shown. The trial court's reliance on the full faith and credit
clause was, however, found to be erroneous.
428. Id. at 667.
429. Id.
430. 233 So.2d 647 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
431. Id. at 649.
432. 242 So.2d 138 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
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The change of custody from the maternal grandfather, as initially
decreed by a West Virginia court, to the maternal grandfather, as ordered
by a Florida court, was upheld in Brooks v. McCutckeon.4 6 The basis for
the decision was that the West Virginia decree was not entitled to full
faith and credit and the trial court's finding of a change of circumstances
"amply supported" its decree.
A custody decree expected to emerge from divorce proceedings in
Germany where the spouses had been stationed was included by the trial
court in a grant of temporary custody to the father to await a decision as
to their custody by the foreign court or other court of proper jurisdiction.
On appeal,4" 7 the decree was held to be contrary to Florida law on the
ground that the Florida court
having jurisdiction of the parties and the . . . children, need not
honor such foreign custody order other than to attach such
weight thereto as it may deserve based on the predicate for its
entry, and in such case the Florida court should not relegate to
another jurisdiction the determination of custody but is under
obligation to decide the question of custody on the merits, as
between the contending parties, leaving or placing the custody
where the best interests of the child or children require.438
The widely publicized Baby Lenore case originated in New York
where the extramarital mother first surrendered her child to an authorized
adoption agency which placed the child with a married couple for adop-
tion, thus giving them "provisional custody." Later, the mother changed
her mind, requested the return of the child, and initiated habeas corpus
proceedings against the adoption agency. The lower court granted her
petition and was affirmed on appeal.43 9 The court invoked the interest of
the child regardless of the fact that "if surrender may be undone, autho-
rized agencies will be inconvenienced or even frustrated in their placement
of children [this being] not a sufficient counterweight."4 The court of
appeals affirmed 44 on the ground that a parent's right to regain custody
is within the discretion of the court which may "approve a revocation of
the surrender when the facts of the individual case warrant it and avoids
the obvious dangers posed by the rigidity of the extreme positions.)
442
Consequently, the court has the power to "direct a change of custody from
the agency back to the natural parent, notwithstanding the document of
surrender," provided it determines that the "interest of such child will be
436. 244 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
437. Anderson v. Anderson, 234 So.2d 722 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
438. Id. at 723.
439. State ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 36 App. Div. 2d 524, 317
N.Y.S.2d 928 (1971). Cf. DeMartino v. Scarpetta, 334 F.Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
440. Id. at 524, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
441. People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d
787, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1971).
442. Id. at 189, 269 N.E.2d at 790, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
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promoted thereby." '443 In any case, the court held that the parent has a
right "superior to that of all others," unless the parent has abandoned the
right or is found to be unfit. This "primacy of status thus accorded the
natural parent is not materially altered or diminished by the mere fact of
surrender under the statute, although it is a factor to be considered by the
court." '444 The court found that the surrender was improvident and that
the child's interest will be best served by its return to the natural mother.
The prospective adopting parents who, according to the opinion, had
provisional custody of the child, were denied the right to intervene on the
ground that they "do not have legal custody of the baby" which was
vested with the adoption agency, nor does the status of prospective adop-
tive parents convey them any vested rights. Therefore, by "not being
permitted to intervene, they are not deprived of a protected interest, as
contemplated by the Constitution," i.e., under the due process of law.445
An appeal by the prospective adopting parents to the United States Su-
preme Court was dismissed for want of jurisdiction and certiorari was
also denied.446 When the prospective adopting parents moved with the
child to Florida, the mother filed another habeas corpus petition, this time
against the prospective adopting parents. The district court of appeal
affirmed the lower court's denial in a per curiam opinion.441 Starting from
the parties' stipulation that a child custody order of a sister state is not
entitled to full faith and credit, but may be given great weight under the
doctrine of comity, the court concluded that "under the circumstances of
this case, the trial judge followed proper procedure and law in ruling that
the best interest and welfare of Lenore were served by leaving her custody
with the appellees," there being "sufficient, competent and substantial evi-
dence in the record to affirm his ruling." '448 At this time, the decision of the
third district court of appeal is not yet final.
The role of habeas corpus in custody litigation was redefined in Crane
v. Hayes449 as an independent action, legal and civil in nature, designed to
secure prompt determination of the legality of restraint. When child cus-
tody is involved, a habeas corpus takes on the nature of an equitable pro-
ceeding to assure the welfare of the child. It is a proper proceeding to
regain custody of a wrongfully withheld child without turning into a full
fledged civil action in equity. On the contrary, it contains its form as a
special proceeding of high priority and limited scope. Upon entry of a
judgment, jurisdiction terminates and the judgment becomes subject to
timely review. Consequently, a final judgment is, as res judicata, entitled
443. Id. 191-92, 269 N.E.2d at 790-91, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 70, quoting N.Y. Soc. Services
Law § 383(1) (McKinney 1970).
444. Id. at 193, 269 N.E.2d at 791, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
445. Id. at 196, 269 N.E.2d at 793, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
446. DeMartino v. Scarpetta, 92 S. Ct. 54 (1971).
447. Scarpetta v. DeMartino, 254 So.2d 813 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
448. Id. at 814.
449. 253 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1971), aff'g 244 So.2d 544 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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to full faith and credit. However, this is not the case when a sister state
decree grants temporary custody. In such a case, a Florida court may, on
petition for habeas corpus, determine the child's best interest. Moreover,
where it is shown that circumstances have changed subsequently to the
entry of a prior order, res judicata and full faith and credit do not prevent
a court of proper jurisdiction to adjudicate according to new circum-
stances. In regard to jurisdiction, the physical absence of the child from
the jurisdiction may be replaced by the domicile of its parent. The domicile
of a child in valid custody of the mother would follow the latter's domicile.
In case of the mother's absence from the jurisdiction, Florida's interest
would cease. In case the mother's custody is not valid, Florida's existing
jurisdiction would continue, particularly if the child has been returned to
Florida.
6. SUPPORT
The trials and tribulations of a mother trying to raise a California-
granted support award of 75 dollars monthly for her extramarital son
born in 1955 on the ground of changed circumstances are drastically
shown in D. R. T. v. 0. M.45 ° The mother's efforts started in 1965 and
resulted in dismissal of her complaint for failure to fully allege her case
within the purview of Florida decisions,4"' a ground patently incorrect.
Not only had the mother, according to the same opinion, submitted a
certified copy of the California judgment, but she also had made sufficient
averments of changed circumstances as well as all necessary jurisdictional
allegations. Nevertheless, the opinion expressly found that she "did not
pray the court to establish the California decree as a Florida decree and
request modification of it by way of supersession of its terms." 2 But,
the true ground for dismissal appears clearly in the opinion, namely that
"future support payments must be established as a Florida decree. Once
established, the chancellor has jurisdiction to modify the decree by way
of supersession of its terms and provisions in accordance with Section
742.06 Fla. Stat., F.S.A.
' '458
Thus supersession became the focal point of this litigation which
came before the same appellate court in 1971. 41 4 There was no question
regarding the defendant's paternity, the propriety of the California sup-
port decree, or the jurisdiction of Florida courts based in defendant's
residence in the state. Difficulties arose from two sources: first, the lower
court increased the support not only by 100 dollars, but also by an equal
additional amount, if the boy were to go to college. The second difficulty
arose in regard to the duration of the father's duty to support his son.
450. 244 So.2d 752 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
451. Mocher v. Rasmussen-Taxdal, 180 So.2d 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
452. Id. at 492.
453. Id. The provision is inapplicable here.
454. D.R.T. v. O.M., 244 So.2d 752 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
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The appellate court took the position that by supersession the California
support decree became subject to the Florida statute limiting the period
of support.
455
The ruling of the appellate court denied increased support for future
college studies on the ground that the "probability or possibility of future
changes in circumstances should not be taken into consideration in deter-
mining the amount of support awards .... ,411 The court ruling that
"[s]uch changes may be conjectural and may never happen," 7 seems
reasonable because the ruling does not adversely affect the California
decree. However, the second point deserves a closer examination since it
involves the proper operation of the full faith and credit clause. In analyz-
ing the situation, the court started from the inaccurate proposition that
the mother had "elected to have the decree established here and then mod-
ified by way of supersession in accordance with F.S. § 742.06, F.S.A." 5
In fact, the election was imposed upon her when the court in Mocker4 59
dismissed her complaint solely because her complaint did not expressly
pray for supersession when asking for the increase in support. Therefore,
the statement that the mother had
chosen to have had the decree modified in California, then under
the rule of comity the decree, as to future installments, could
have been established as a local decree and enforced by those
equitable remedies customary in the enforcement of our local
decrees for support48 0
seems hardly fair.
It is generally admitted that once past due support installments
granted by sister state decrees become final under the law of the juris-
diction rendering them, they will qualify for full faith and credit and as
such may become a basis for an action on a foreign judgment. It seems
that when a foreign support decree is "established" as a local decree,
such action becomes unnecessary and past due installments may be en-
forced without the need for an action by appropriate equitable remedies.
Whether or not such "domestication" is in the nature of supersession
seems questionable since, by its very meaning, supersession wipes out a
sister state support decree, at least regarding the amount of support, and
replaces it by new and independent local determination. However, the
issue in the present case is narrower. The issue involved only the duration
of support because the amount due was at least partially consented to by
the father, and the additional raise was denied. The restriction of the
original period for support presents a constitutional problem. It is well
455. FLA. STAT. § 742.041 (1969).
456. D.R.T. v. O.M., 244 So.2d 752, 754 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971) (emphasis added).
457. Id.
458. Id. (emphasis in original).
459. Mocher v. Rasmussen-Texdal, 180 So.2d 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
460. D.R.T. v. O.M., 244 So.2d 752, 754 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
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established that states may grant more than the minimum required by
the full faith and credit clause, but never less. In this particular case, the
court, using the mystery of supersession, deprived the California decree of
one of its elements, namely the determination of how long the duty to
support shall last. The "election" by the mother to have the California
decree locally "established" and "then modified by way of supersession"
did not modify or eliminate the obligation to give a final sister state decree
full faith and credit, particularly since there is no indication that this part
of the decree is amenable to change under California law. Even if the
mother was induced to apply for supersession, such prayer would subject
her only to local procedural rules, including remedies, but not to substan-
tive provisions of the Florida Bastardy Act. Paternity as well as the duty
to support and its duration have been finally decided by a California
court in accordance with California law, and these decisions are protected
under the full faith and credit clause. In fact, by using the notion of
supersession, the court imposed Florida's substantive law on the mother
regarding extramarital paternity, a position untenable even under a
choice-of-laws approach. Such an approach, attempted by the dissent, is
unavailable in a full faith and credit situation because both mother and
son are residents of California which, in extramarital filiation, are decisive
contacts. In any case, the court has violated the precept of the full faith
and credit clause, and it also might have deprived the mother of property
without due process of law.
Similarly, a mother became enmeshed in the web of legal niceties in
Villano v. Harper.6' There the mother succeeded in having certain Colo-
rado divorce decrees regarding child support-both interlocutory and
final-established as Florida judgments in order "to obtain future enforce-
ment of child support ... and to obtain a judgment for unpaid, past-due
child support."" 2 The appellate court dismissed her alternative causes of
action for "past due child support which sought to establish two Colorado
child support arrearage judgments as Florida judgments"4 ' on the ground
that the defendant father received no notice of the Colorado proceedings
wherein the arrearage judgments were rendered. This ruling seems to be
ill-founded since the appellate court found not only that "Florida indulges
in the presumption that the courts of a sister state have no authority to
alter a final decree as to past-due installments for child support," 4 but
also that the mother "in an abundance of caution" introduced "incontro-
verted evidence that under Colorado law, upon entry of a Colorado divorce
decree directing installment child support payments to be made, each
installment becomes a final judgment debt as it matures, and these are
unmodifiable." 6 5 These findings distinguish this case from Sackler v.
461. 248 So.2d 205 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).





Sackler46 6 which held that a foreign judgment for arrearages is necessary
to qualify them for enforceability by ordinary legal process, but only be-
cause the New York Civil Practice Act46 7 as then in force, allegedly re-
quired such judgment. However, since according to Colorado law support
installments became final once due, there was no obstacle to their enforce-
ment, even by equitable remedies. Therefore, even though the defendant
father contended that he did not receive notice of the proceedings which
resulted in two Colorado child support arrearage judgments, the children
were entitled to their benefit. In regard to future installments, this opin-
ion takes the position that such decrees may be established as local decrees
and thereby become clothed with all the equitable remedies by which the
enforcement of a local decree of alimony may be secured. The court
added that such transformation of an obligation to support into more
specific form, such as a decree to pay, does not make it an ordinary debt
but a continuing obligation. In any case, the father retains the right to
request a modification of a foreign decree established here as a local
decree as to future installments.
7. PATERNITY
The one reported case deals with jurisdiction to establish extramarital
paternity. The appellate court468 held that such action is one in personam,
citing T. J. K. v. N. B.,469 and that consequently, jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant may not be acquired by constructive service.
E. Decedents' Estates
The reference in a will to the "income and principal statutes of the
State of Florida" was interpreted in Jenkins v. Donahoo4 7 ° as a reference
to the Uniform Principal and Income Act 47' as in effect at the time when
the will was executed.
In In re Estate of Johnson,472 the probate judge refused to allow the
value of property conveyed by the deceased husband without his wife's
joining or relinquishing her rights, to be used in determining the dower of
the widow, a Florida domiciliary. The appellate court affirmed on the
basis of the general rule that the right to dower (or statutory forced share
interest) in real property is "determined by the law that would be applied
by the court of the situs (although the determining law may be otherwise
as to movable property) .,47' This would, the court continued, enable the
courts of the situs of land to determine that the wife has "no dower right
466. 47 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1950).
467. N.Y.C.P.A. § 1171-b (1920), as amended through 1948, repealed by N.Y. CIV. PRAc.
LAW § 10001 (McKinney 1963); now N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 244 (McKinney 1964).
468. J.E.S. v. B.J.F., 240 So.2d 520 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
469. 237 So.2d 592 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
470. 231 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1970).
471. Fla. Laws 1937, ch. 18392, §§ 3, 5.
472. 240 So.2d 840 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
473. Id. at 841.
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in the property and would not apply Florida law in the determination of
wife's rights." Consequently, if she has no dower rights in the real prop-
erty "then it is difficult to see where the Florida legislature has empowered
a Florida probate court to divert Florida probate assets from the heirs or
legatees who would otherwise receive them and to award those assets to
the widow as dower in the out-of-state property." '47 4 This point was partic-
ularly troublesome because the Michigan land was validly conveyed "in
full compliance with the law and custom of the state in which the property
was located, and in which the widow has no inchoate dower.
' 47
F. Corporations
Recent legislative enactments have affected choice-of-law aspects of
particular corporate activities. In regard to mergers, the amended Florida
Statutes section 608.21 (Supp. 1970) provides that consolidation or
merger with entities established in other states or countries is permissible,
but only if the laws under which said other corporation or corporations
are formed permit such consolidation or merger. The respective agree-
ments must be signed and acknowledged by each of the corporations in-
volved in accordance with the same laws. The transacting of business by
out-of-state banking corporations, one of the exemptions from limitations
contained under Florida Statutes section 659.5 7(1) (b) (1969) has been
amended in 1971."' That amendment has added "servicing directly"
persons authorized to transact business in Florida in addition to the origi-
nal "entering into mortgage servicing contracts."
G. Trusts
Recent statutory amendments enacted in 197 1477 affect some choice-
of-law aspects of the rules regarding trusts and trustees. In regard to trust
powers granted to banks under Florida Statutes section 660.10 (1969),
the powers which may be granted under a will or other testamentary in-
474. Id.
475. Id. See also Miller v. Perry, 307 F. Supp. 633 (E.D.N.C. 1969) (Florida appointed
administrator's action dismissed because of lack of diversity). The 1970 legislature enacted
Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-295, adding FLA. STAT. § 665.61 (Supp. 1970), which in para. 2 regu-
lates the right of a personal foreign representative of a deceased regarding his safe deposit box
kept by a savings association.
476. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-336, amending FLA. STAT. § 609.57(1)(b) 1969. Relations
between Delaware corporation and Florida holder of warrant are governed by Delaware law.
Tisch Family Foundation, Inc. v. Texas Nat'l Petroleum Co., 326 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Del.
1971).
An aftermath to Curtiss v. McCall, 244 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969) (Survey IV at
492) was introduced by the court with the statement, "To man, the sophisticated scavenger
cash is carrion." That case denied prohibition against the circuit judge to restrain him from
proceeding with an action to enjoin a Florida stakeholder, a bank, from turning over estate
funds to the local administrator, where each administrator (one in Florida and the other in
Georgia) refused to "go into the jurisdiction of the other," on the ground that Florida
court has decided the issue of jurisdiction, including the lack of it on the part of Georgia
courts. Lewis v. Hodges, 254 So.2d 397 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
477. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-55, amending FLA. STAT. § 660.10(3) (1969).
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strument have been expanded to include also "devises of real property
located in Florida" which may be sold, transferred and conveyed.
H. Taxation
In City of Jacksonville v. Florida Fresh Water Corp.,7 8 the court
held that taxes levied on supplying of fresh water to ships lying in harbor
within the city limits did not constitute an illegal burden on interstate
commerce, even though the ships so supplied were engaged in interstate
and foreign commerce, and the supplier's activities took place on navi-
gable waters of the United States.
I. Criminal Law
The territorial scope of criminal statutes, in this case of the willful
withholding of support from children under Florida Statutes section
856.04 (1969), was at issue in State v. Darnell,479 which involved the
location of the perpetrator and the victims. The trial court dismissed the
information because of lack of jurisdiction, and the appellate court af-
firmed. 480 However, the Florida Supreme Court quashed the decision on
the authority of Dukes v. State,48 which is to be understood in the sense
that defendant's "citizenship is irrelevant . . . if either the defendant or
his children are present in the state when the desertion and non-support
occur.;482 The statutory language "in this State" was held to refer to the
crime committed, rather than to the location of the father committing it.
"The evil effect," the court continues, "of his abandonment operated
against the defendant's children in the State of Florida and against the
State of Florida.1
488
If the defendant had stood immediately across the Florida line
in a sister state and had directed some form of physical mistreat-
ment to his children who were physically across the line in the
State of Florida, the adverse effect upon said children would
have been similar to that resulting from defendant's failure to
provide the support for them in this State.1
484
Importation of marijuana from the Panama Canal Zone into Flor-
ida was involved in United States v. Matthews. 485 The court held that in
regard to such transportation the Zone is to be regarded as a foreign
country, unless there is a specific provision to the contrary. However,
the conviction was reversed on other grounds. A foreign seaman's convic-
tion for bringing marijuana into the United States without having it regis-
478. 247 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
479. 230 So.2d 151 (Fla. 1970).
480. State v. Darnell, 217 So.2d 127 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969); Survey IV at 496.
481. 148 Fla. 109, 3 So.2d 754 (1941).
482. State v. Darnell, 230 So.2d 151, 152-53 (Fla. 1970) (emphasis in original).
483. Id. at 153.
484. Id.
485. 427 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1970).
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tered was affirmed in United States v. Betancourt48 6 against his contention
that he was denied due process on the ground that he did not know of the
requirement. Persons who conducted a lottery in Florida near the Georgia
border were found guilty of interstate travel with the intent to "promote,
manage, establish, carry on or facilitate ' 48 7 such activities. The United
States Supreme Court 8' reversed on the ground that defendants were not
shown to have crossed state lines in connection with their operation, re-
gardless of the fact that their Florida establishment was frequented by
out-of-state gamblers.
A conviction for conspiracy to overthrow the government of Haiti
was affirmed in United States v. Leon 489 in spite of defense reliance on
Rivard v. United States490 and the fact that the underlying conspiracy
was formulated outside of the United States. Equally ineffective was the
contention that items had been admitted in evidence, even though they
had been seized on a United States auxiliary airfield in the Bahamas. The
search was held legal since it was conducted in accordance with military
law.
VI. AVIATION
In an action4 1' by a passenger's widow against the estate of the pilot
and against the corporate owner of an airplane which crashed at sea, the
plaintiff was successful against the former, but failed against the latter.
The court ruled that maritime law creates no vicarious liability on the
part of the owner unless he is guilty of direct negligence. The Florida
doctrine of dangerous instrumentality was held inapplicable to actions
arising on the high seas, and the Federal Aviation Act 492 was found to
create no federal cause of action.493
In Compania Dominicana de Aviacion v. Knapp,49 4 a claim arose
from the operation by a Dominican carrier of an aircraft which crashed
into an automobile shop in Miami, killing two of the plaintiff's three sons.
The application of the lex loci delicti was unquestioned. One of the grounds
for appeal on the part of the defendant carrier, which had to pay 1,800,000
dollars in damages, was the fact that the trial court denied a motion for
a new trial because defendant's insurer was mentioned. The court found
not only that the insurance company was properly joined under the Shin-
gleton doctrine; it also held that "awarding a new trial because of the
mention of insurance would be an improper result where the government
of a sovereign nation is the alleged tortfeasor, ' 49 5 a rather cryptic remark.
486. 427 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1970).
487. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(3) (1970).
488. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971).
489. 441 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1971).
490. 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967).
491. Lockwood v. Astronautics Flying Club, Inc., 437 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1971).
492. 49 U.S.C. § 1301(26) (1970).
493. See Rodgers v. Ray Gardner Flying Serv., Inc., 435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1970).
494. 251 So.2d 18 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
495. Id. at 21.
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Aircraft mortgages continue to play a significant role in the financing
of the industry. Their regulation was affected by the Uniform Commercial
Code496 which presents, on the interamerican scene,497 a steadily chang-
ing picture. A significant domestic case is worth noticing. 98
On the international level, the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air (Warsaw,
1929)... was again °° amended, this time by the protocol signed at Guate-
mala City on March 8, 1971.01 Among the signatories was the United
States, and the Protocol will enter into force upon ratification by thirty
countries.
Criminal conflict rules applicable to crimes of the air present a com-
plex statutory situation."°2 Within the federal criminal code, the notion of
"Cspecial maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States" applies
as defined in United States Code title 18, section 7(5) (1970):
Any aircraft belonging in whole or in part to the United States,
or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or under
the laws of the United States, or any State, Territory, district,
or possession thereof, while such aircraft is in flight over the high
seas, or over any other waters within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of
any particular state.503
The subsequent amendment to the Federal Aviation Act, enacted in
1961,54 and dealing mainly with air piracy and related crimes, limited
its application to acts taking place on aircraft "in flight in air commerce,"
as defined in section 101(4) of the Act. These references have been
amended in 1970 by the Act to implement the Convention on Offences and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,0 5 and for other pur-
496. See Note, International Aircraft Financing under the Uniform Commercial Code, 2
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 180 (1969).
497. See Bayitch, Aircraft Mortgage in the Western Hemisphere: Recent Developments,
2 LAW. Am. 137 (1970).
498. Dowell v. Beech Accep. Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 647 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970)
(holder of prior, recorded security interest in new airplane prevailed over subsequent buyer
in ordinary course of business who failed to record his own title of search Federal Avia-
tion Agency records for security holder's prior claim).
499. [1934] 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876. For recent developments see GILES, UNIFORM
CoM-ERcIAL LAW: AN ESSAY ON INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS 108
(1970); Tompkins, Limitation of Liability by Treaty and Statute, 36 J. Am L. Comm. 421
(1970).
500. The Hague Protocol (1955) and Guadalajara agreement (1961) were not ratified
by the United States. In 1966, the so-called Montreal Agreement was added. CAB Order No.
E23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966); Survey III at 565.
501. For pertinent extracts from the text, see McKenry, Aviation, 3 LAW. Am. 661
(1971).
502. See generally Survey IV at 497-500.
503. 18 U.S.C. § 7(5) (1970).
504. Pub. L. No. 87-197, 75 Stat. 466 (1961).
505. [1969] 3 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768; see Survey IV at 497. The Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Oct. 14, 1971, [1971]-U.S.T.-, T.I.A.S.
No. 7192, art. 1, contains a definition of the offence to be committed on board aircraft in
flight as defined in art. 3, para. (1). The Convention applies only to flights which took off or
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poses."°6 The convention referred to in the Act is the Tokyo Convention of
1963 which imposed upon the contracting countries the duty to "take such
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction as the State of
registration over offences committed on board aircraft registered in such
State. 507 The United States not only fulfilled this obligation, but also
went further and regulated criminal conflict law in situations not covered
by the Tokyo Convention.
This was done by inserting in section 101 of the Federal Aviation Act
a new subsection (32) which introduced a new term, that of "special air-
craft jurisdiction of the United States." This jurisdiction embraces (a)
"civil aircraft of the United States," apparently meaning private aircraft
registered in the United States; and (b) "aircraft of the national defense
forces of the United States," i.e., military aircraft.0 8 Going beyond the
scope of the Tokyo Convention, the amendment also includes within the
newly created notion
(c) any other aircraft-
(i) within the United States, or
(ii) outside the United States which has its next scheduled
destination or last point of departure in the United
States provided that in either case it next actually lands
in the United States. 09
The new delineation of "special aircraft jurisdiction of the United
States" has replaced the previously used term "in flight in air commerce"
in criminal provisions in section 902 of the Federal Aviation Act, particu-
larly subsection 902 (i), (j), and (k). It follows that the crimes of air-
craft piracy, interference with flight crew members of flight attendants,
and certain crimes aboard aircraft in flight as taken from the federal
Criminal Code and enumerated under (k) (1) and (2) of section 902 of
the Federal Aviation Act will be punishable under the Act if committed
on civil or military aircraft of the United States in flight. The crimes will
be punishable regardless of the place where the aircraft was at the time
of the commission of the crime as well as on foreign aircraft in flight
"within the United States," or outside the United States as determined
under (ii). The Act also provides for a definition of an aircraft in flight
to mean "from the moment when power is applied for the purpose of take-
off until the moment when the landing run ends. 5
10
actually landed outside of the territory of the state of registration, regardless of whether the
flight was international or domestic (art. 3, para. 3). The offense of seizure of aircraft "shall
be deemed to be included in any extradition treaty existing" between countries members to
this Convention (art. 8, para. 1). The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on September 23, 1971, is not yet
in force.
506. 84 Stat. 921; 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i)(2) (1970).
507. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
Dec. 4, 1969, [1969] 3 U.S.T. 2941, 44, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, art. III, para. 2.
508. Pub. L. No. 91-449(1) 84 Stat. 929, amending 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i) (1970).
509. Pub. L. No. 91-449(1), 84 Stat. 929, amending 49 U.S.C. § 1472(j) (1970).
510. Pub. L. No. 91-449(1), 84 Stat. 929, amending 49 U.S.C. § 1472(k) (1970).
CONFLICT OF LAWS
As a consequence, the amended section 902(k) (1) of the Federal
Aviation Act will read:
Whoever, while aboard an aircraft within the special aircraft
jurisdiction of the United States, commits an act which, if com-
mitted within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United States as defined in section 7 of title 18, United
States Code, would be in violation of sections 113, 114, 661, 662,
111, 113, 2031, or 2111 of such title 18, shall be punished as
provided therein.
This may offer a fascinating exercise in statutory interpretation, but
there must be a better way to draft laws.
VII. ADMIRALTY
The nature of the contract being the criterion for the applicability
vel non of the laws of admiralty was decisive in Jack Neilson v. Tug
Peggy,5"1 an action by the owner of a vessel for recovery of unpaid rent-
als under a lease-purchase agreement cast in form of bareboat charter.
However, an action by a naval architect for services rendered in the con-
struction of a vessel were held not to be within admiralty law in Bond
v. F/V Mermaid.512 In tort actions the locus delicti still prevails with
the understanding that the locus is not the place where the wrongful act
had its inception, but rather where the impact of the act or omission
results in injury. Finding that the damages demanded were not based
on faulty manufacture, but were caused by heavy weather during the
crossing from Miami to Bimini, the action 13 was held to be maritime
in nature.
A number of jurisdictional issues were raised and litigated in In
re Unterweser Reederei, GmbH,5"4 an action brought by the tower for
mitigation of its liability. Underweser, a German limited liability firm,
contracted with Zapata, a Delaware corporation with its principal place
of business in Texas, to tow the former's drilling barge, Chaparral, from
Louisiana to Italy. While proceeding in the Gulf of Mexico, the barge
suffered damages and made for Tampa, the nearest port. There, Bremen,
the tug which towed the barge, was arrested and her master served with
Zapata's complaint for 3.5 million dollars in damages. In the proceedings
511. 428 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1970).
512. 311 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D. Fla. 1970). A contract for the sale of a ship is not a mari-
time contract, and therefore an admiralty court has no jurisdiction to compel specific per-
formance. Similarly, a contract for construction of a vessel is not within admiralty jurisdic-
tion, nor a mortgage, unless it is within exclusive admiralty jurisdiction under the Ship
Mortgage Act of 1920 [46 U.S.C. § 911 (1970)]. Generally, a maritime contract is one which
involves maritime transportation, and relates to navigable waters and concerns maritime
employment. However, the mere fact that a ship is involved will not bring the cause within
admiralty jurisdiction. Richard Bertram & Co. v. Yacht, Wanda, 447 F.2d 966 (5th Cir.
1971).
513. Finkel v. Challenger Marine Corp., 316 F. Supp. 549 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
514. In re Unterweser Reederei, GmbH, 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970); reh. denied,
446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971).
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brought before the federal court for the Middle District of Florida,
Unterweser made a number of procedural motions: to dismiss because of
lack of jurisdiction; to decline as forum non conveniens; or, to stay
proceedings because of the forum selection clause in the contract. The
rulings of the trial court have been affirmed on appeal and are discussed
in the jurisdictional section of this study (section II supra).
The availability of actions under the Jones Act to foreign seamen
was decided by adopting the multi-contacts method in Lauritzen v. Lar-
sen 5 15 and followed in Florida in Corella v. McCormick Shipping Corp. 1
Recently, in Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis," this holding was modified
to some extent. The plaintiff, a Greek seaman whose contract provided
that Greek law and Greek collective labor agreements applied and that
all claims be adjudicated in Greek courts, was injured in the port of New
Orleans on board a vessel owned by a Greek corporation with its main
offices in New York and additional offices in New Orleans. More than 95
percent of the corporation's stock was owned by a Greek national who
had been a lawful permanent resident in this country since 1952. In
its opinion, the United States Supreme Court noted the seven contacts
considered in Lauritzen, but held that the test is not a mechanical one
since the "significance of one or more factors must be considered in the
light of the national interest served by the assertion of Jones Act jurisdic-
tion."5 18 The Lauritzen list is not exhaustive. The base of operations
in the United States is another factor as is the fact that the vessel in-
volved is one of a fleet "earning income from cargo originating or terminat-
ing here." '519 Consequently, their alien owner may not escape the obliga-
tion imposed on a Jones Act employer although the flag, the nationality
of the seamen, the fact that the employment contract was Greek, and
that the employee agreed to be compensated in Greece are, in the opinion
of the court, "in the totality of the circumstances of this case minor
weights on the scales compared with the substantial and continuing
contacts which this alien owner has with this country. °2 0 Against a
strong dissent, the court held the Greek owner to be an employer under
the Jones Act.
The widow of a longshoreman, killed when working on a vessel in
navigable waters within Florida, brought an action in a state court against
the owner of the vessel for damages for wrongful death as well as for
pain and suffering of the deceased. Upon removal of the action to a federal
court, the defendant urged that maritime law provided no recovery for
wrongful death which occurred within state's territorial waters. On an
interlocutory appeal, the appellate court certified the question to the Su-
515. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
516. 101 So.2d 908 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
517. 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
518. Id. at 309.
519. Id. at 310.
520. Id.
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preme Court of Florida under Florida Statutes section 2 5.03 1 (1969). The
court answered the question in the negative521 upon which the judgment of
the trial court for defendant was affirmed. 22 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari528 and overruled the holding in The Harris-
burg,524 thus allowing recovery of damages for death of a longshoreman
due to unseaworthiness of a vessel on navigable waters of a state. The
change was not so much due to the inherent weakness in The Harrisburg,
branded as an "unjustifiable anomaly in the present maritime law, '5 25 as
to the general trend indicated by federal as well as state legislation grant-
ing recovery. According to the court, this policy has "become itself a part
of our law, to be given its appropriate weight not only in matters of statu-
tory interpretation but also in those of decisional law. 5 20
Damages for spoilage and loss of shipments of frozen shrimp in
freezer-trailers from Nicaragua to Miami were demanded in Inter-Ameri-
can Foods, Inc. v. Coordinated Caribbean Transport.527 The issue was
the applicability of section 1304(5) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
dealing with the limitation of carrier's liability for goods transported in
packages. The court found that the sealed and strapped master cartons
containing frozen shrimp constitute packages under the Act regardless
of their being stored for transportation in a trailer. However, even if the
shipper had delivered a sealed container to the defendant, the definition
of a package in the Brussels Protocol was found to clearly establish "that
each unit in 'palletized' or 'containerized' cargo constitutes a 'pack-
age,' ,,528 and consequently, qualifies for limitation of liability under the
Act.
The M/V NILI, which made repeated voyages into federal
courts529 in Florida, generated an "international multi-party lien priority
race."5 ' Once the vessel was sold at auction, two main issues arose: is
the mortgage held by the State of Israel a preferred and valid mortgage
under United States Code, title 46, section 951 (1970), and whether the
preclusionary clause in Israel's foreign ship mortgage by which the
original owner of the vessel agreed not to encumber the NILI is valid and
effective. In State of Israel v. Motor Vessel NILI,5 3' the appellate court
521. Morange v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1968) ; Survey IV at 475.
522. Morange v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969).
523. Morange v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
524. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
525. Morange v. States Marines Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
526. Id.; Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co., 431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970) (aircrash within
Louisiana territorial waters); cf. Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1387 (3d Cir.
1971); Guilbeau v. Calzada, 240 So.2d 104 (La. App. 1970) (collision of boats).
527. 313 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
528. Id.
529. Survey IV at 502.
530. State of Israel v. Motor Vessel Nili, 435 F.2d 242, 243 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'g State
of Israel v. Motor Vessel Nili, 318 F. Supp. 1196 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
531. Id. Cf. Florida Bahamas Lines, Ltd., v. Steel Barge "Star 800," 433 F.2d 1243 (5th
Cir. 1970).
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affirmed the holding of the lower federal court which answered the first
question in the affirmative and the second in the negative. The good
vessel also was involved in tax difficulties. 2 when it became "unsuccessful
in the hopes of her owner, operator and perhaps preferred-ship-mortgagee
angel, the State of Israel, to tap the rich tourist trade as a cruise ship in
and out of the Port of Miami." 53 The issue was the amount of dockage
due under the port authority's tariff, the State of Israel contending un-
successfully that only half of the dockage was due since the vessel was
berthed for purposes other than loading or discharging cargo. The court
observed that a tariff "like the law of the Medes and Persians which
altereth not, is more than a consensual contract. It has the force of law." '534
The only tolerance permissible is in its construction, "a task which here is
free of tariffese which often plagues such problems, sending judges search-
ing for a way to put the burden on a supposedly expert body." '535
Other cases decided during the survey period deal with charter agree-
ments; insurance; " limitation of actions; 58 and forfeiture. 53 9
VIII. CONCLUSION
In a period of strong revisionist trends presently experienced in the
area of conflict law in this country, such efforts unavoidably have their
ups and downs. Regardless of their fate, however, they perform a valu-
able function: they pose questions where for too long passive acquiescence
has replaced rationalization. Aggressive and overstating their objectives
at the start, the revisionist trends meet their final test, not in books and
law reviews, but in legal practice, particularly in courts. There, these
theories face the facts of life as no clever abstractions or fancy construc-
tions decide their survival. In any case, the attitude of accepting tradi-
tional solutions has past, and every rule has to show its inherent strength
in order to survive. In this scrutiny, the eager reformists have frequently
succeeded, but they have also failed, not because of any errors in their
theoretical principles, but because their solutions, as attractive and
"just" or "reasonable" they may seem, have proven incompatible with
the present needs of a mass society which appears to favor certainty over
ultimate case-by-case justice.
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CONFLICT OF LAWS
The trends are reflected in publications produced during the period
under review. The most significant is the new Restatement. 540 Faced with
the agitated state of the area, the Restatement tries to bridge the gap
between tradition and reform and allows law-making in areas beyond
established law. In these frontier areas, solutions should take into con-
sideration the following factors:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems:
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular
issues.
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be ap-
plied."'
There is only one treatise to be noted, Professor Weintraub's Com-
mentary,5 42 a down-to-earth presentation of the law and its leading ideas.
A thought provoking summation of some of Professor Ehrenzweig's im-
pressive contributions has been published as a Hague lecture,5 48 as was
Professor Cavers' lucid overview of the American conflicts scene.5 44 The
variety and intensity of works published in law reviews by addicts on
both sides of the cathedra are most impressive. Among them the continuing
nation-wide survey by Professor Leflar"5 provides a much needed overall
pragmatical perspective, supplemented by an increasing number of state-
by-state surveys.
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